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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the main PE risks faced by multinational enterprises at 
different stages of value chain with a focus on distribution and to suggest ways to address these 
risks to ensure tax compliance in multiple jurisdictions.  The term “PE risk” in this paper means 
the risk of failure to comply with applicable regulations in identifying permanent establishment in 
situations where certain business activities of the enterprise are held outside the country of its tax 
residence. 
 
The thesis is done by conducting a literature review and structuring the results under risk 
management methodology. This research focuses on the substance of the PE concept under the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. It does not cover procedural aspects of profit attribution to PE nor 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
Previous research has uncovered the challenges in balancing roles of the PE concept in ensuring 
both sufficient tax revenue and flexibility for taxpayers. The complexity theoretical approaches to 
the PE concept in the OECD Model is multiplied by diverse sources of law that may define the 
presence of PE on a case-by-case basis: supranational regulations (e.g., the EU law), bilateral and 
multilateral tax treaties, domestic laws, and often unpredictable case law. Comprehensive tax risk 
management framework should ensure that MNE will not overlook risks that are likely to happen 
due to communication failures, agency problems, or misunderstanding of applicable regulations. 
Keystones of an efficient tax risk management framework are effective business model tax risk 
assessment based on accurate and detailed document management and clear communications on 
tax compliance goals and risks among multiple stakeholders.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the study 
The primary ways to define the right to tax an enterprise on its profits arising from the territory 
of a specific country are to consider whether the foreign company as a resident or having a 
permanent establishment (PE). 1  The concept of permanent establishment (PE) determines 
whether an enterprise has sufficient activity in another territory to create a taxable presence there 
and thus to justify that country’s taxation of the business profits.2  
Governments aim to prevent companies from artificial channelling of the profits to entities in 
low-tax jurisdictions, as corporate tax revenue losses can amount to 4-10% of all global tax 
revenues (USD 100-240 bn annually).3 The reasons for these losses are aggressive tax planning 
schemes and challenges brought by domestic laws and their practical implementation by tax 
administrations.4 Globalisation and digitalisation advancements make it easier to find legislative 
loopholes and plan the tax avoidance schemes. In recent years, Action 7 of OECD Base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) projects have resulted in a significant expansion of the PE definition, 
and especially in lowering the threshold for PE created by dependent agents.5  
As a result, MNEs are facing a growing need to assess where PE risks come from and what PE 
risks are materializing, as well as the need to develop approaches to managing PE risk, either by 
ensuring that no PE arises, or by assessing the level of profit that could be attributable to it. This 
would allow MNEs to satisfy diverse and sometimes unpredictable requirements of local tax 
authorities. PE risk management also becomes one of the priority services provided by 
consulting and audit companies.6 For this reason, identifying and managing PE risks is vital for 
multinational enterprises to stay compliant with the diversity of local laws and tax treaties when 
operating globally.  
1.2. Research objective, questions and structure 
                                                          
1 Antti Tokola, “The Implementation of the Controlled Foreign Company Rules in the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive in Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – The Effects on the Holding Company Structures of Finnish 
Groups” [2018] 72(3) Bulletin for International Taxation 173 
2 Yasin Uslu, “An Analysis of “Google Taxes” in the Context of Action 7 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting Initiative” [2018] 72(4a) Bulletin for International Taxation IFBD accessed 20 October 2018, citing 
International Tax Glossary, Glossary IBFD. 
3OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Explanatory Statement (2015) 4 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018  
4OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project. Explanatory Statement (2015) 4 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018 
5 OECD, BEPS Action 7 Additional Guidance on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. Discussion 
Draft (2017) 5 <https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/beps-discussion-draft-additional-guidance-attribution-of-
profits-to-permanent-establishments.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018 
6Michael Cooper, “BEPS: Permanent Establishments” (PwC, October 2015) 
<https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/tax/insights/permanent-establishments.html> accessed 20 October 2018 
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The research objective of this thesis is to identify the main PE risks faced by multinational 
enterprises at different stages of value chain, with a focus on distribution, and finally to suggest 
ways to address these risks to ensure tax compliance.  The term “PE risk” in this paper refers to 
the risk of failure to comply with regulations on identifying taxable presence in the form of PE 
when certain business activities of the enterprise are held outside the country of its tax residency. 
To reach this objective, this research paper should answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the rationale and key features of permanent establishment concept under OECD 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (“OECD Model Tax Convention”), 
which is a model for countries concluding bilateral tax conventions? 
2. What are the main principles of tax risk management and specific stages of managing 
PE-specific tax risks? How do they help MNEs to identify, analyse and mitigate PE risks 
in the enterprise? 
3. How can MNEs (on the example of consumer electronics manufacturing industry) 
address the risk of dependent agent PE in the tax risk management framework? 
The research model is restricted to identifying whether PE is present in certain business 
arrangements and planning tax control framework that would enhance timely PE identification in 
different business arrangements following the process starting from R&D of consumer 
electronics to its distribution to consumers. This research does not cover the detailed analysis of 
attribution of profits to PE7 or other procedural or dispute resolution aspects connected with 
identifying PE, nor the secondary effects of a PE, such as the impact of the PE status on income 
classification or determining tax withholding obligations of the employer.8 The primary source 
of analysis on the PE concept is the OECD Model Tax Convention. Other sources are referred to 
in order to support the general approaches of the OECD Model in interpreting the notion of PE, 
and to guide MNEs on what they should take into account when operating in multiple markets 
simultaneously. This thesis focuses on PE risks faced by multinational enterprise operating in the 
sphere of producing consumer electronics and their risks arising from employee mobility and 
transportation and distribution arrangements. 
The novel contribution of this research project is in exploring the post-BEPS regulatory 
environment through legal methodology and risk management methodology. It provides MNEs 
                                                          
7 Article 7 of OECD Model Tax Convention states that “profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be 
taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in other Contracting State through a permanent 
establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable to the 
permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 may be taxed in that other State”. 
8 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 10 
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with an understandable and practically oriented guidance on reading the provisions of OECD 
Model Tax Convention and then implementing concrete steps to ensure compliance with them. It 
also incorporates a diversity of opinions from the business/industry sector, tax consulting sector, 
and academia on existing taxation regimes of PE.  
This thesis consists of three chapters covering PE concept, its tax risk management and case 
study on dependent agent PE risk management in consumer electronics industry. The first 
chapter of the thesis focuses on exploring the general concept of PE, its role in international 
taxation, and the scope of its application. This allows us to understand the rationale of the PE 
concept and the general trend of its development in soft law and binding legislative norms as 
well as the main sources of legal uncertainty surrounding the PE concept.  The second chapter 
concentrates on the analysis of tax risk management frameworks and how they help to deal with 
PE risks at different stages of tax risk management. This analysis is based on the key risk 
features of the PE concept identified in the first chapter and provides a systemic approach for 
assessing, prioritising, and treating PE risks.  Chapter three provides an example of the practical 
application of PE tax risk management steps in addressing dependent agent PE risk under 
changes to Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Convention (BEPS Action 7). The structure of the 
thesis aims to gradually acquaint the reader with the challenges of interpreting the general PE 
concept and using risk management frameworks for dealing with it before moving to a deeper 
analysis of a dependent agent PE as one of the types of PE. This will allow the reader to see how 
legal research can be applied practically by sharing systematised knowledge among functions of 
an MNE. It also makes knowledge management a necessary component of tax controls 
framework and tax governance in general. 
1.3. Methodology 
Research of complex PE concept requires usage multiple methods that will allow to explore 
practical implications of applying a legal fiction (PE as a “fixed place of business”) to dynamic 
and versatile business arrangements. To map PE risks, it is important to identify and analyse key 
compound elements of PE concept under Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Provision, also through 
the prism general concepts of law (“person”, “agent”, “in the name of”). For this reason, the 
primary method of research is legal method. In this research, legal method will include 
comparative legal method used in analysing specifics of agency relationship in common and civil 
law countries (chapter 3). To understand the rationale behind OECD Model Tax Convention 
provisions on PE, teleological method is used to analyse the goals and principles of regulation of 
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international taxation in general9, and of PE concept in specific. In addition to that, descriptive 
method is used to analyse the common business arrangements in the value chain of the MNE 
before exploring its PE risks. Analytical method is a primary method to identify PE risk 
management strategies in chapter 2 and testing its application in chapter 3. My recommendations 
on risk treatment stages are also based on observational research method due to my practical 
experience in tax consulting and in developing internal controls framework. 
1.4. Literature review 
There is growing research on the substantial provisions of Article 5 of OECD Model Tax 
Provision.  The starting point for PE research is Skaar's “Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a 
Tax Treaty Principle” (1991) that has created a basis for a critical research of PE concepts, 
elements and role in taxation. More recent research is represented by works of M.Lang, H. Pijl, E. 
Reimer, M. Kobetsky, J.-F. Dutriez, J. Schwarz. However, analysis of most recent post-BEPS 
changes from the perspective of business, not of a legislator or tax authorities, is addressed most 
in publication of Big Four companies and the smaller tax consulting companies. Namely, 
publications collected in “Dependent Agents as Permanent Establishments” (ed. M. Lang) 
provide a detailed analysis of history of dependent agent PE concept but do not cover post-BEPS 
reality as it was published in 2014. Most recent academic publications either address challenges 
of PE in digital economy on general level, or look into highly detailed aspects of PE, such as PE 
risks in certain warehousing activities. It shows the lack of conceptual analysis of changes 
brought by OECD Model Tax Convention 2017 and implications it will have for tax functions of 
MNEs.  
When it comes to tax risk management side of PE analysis, the research focuses almost 
exclusively on tax risk management performed by tax authorities. Its deliverables are practical 
guidance for tax authorities, such as Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrations published 
by European Commission10 HMRC Internal Manual on Tax Compliance Risk Management11, 
Australian Tax Office Tax Risk Management and Governance Review Guide. 12  However, 
practical steps on ensuring tax compliance from a taxpayer's perspective are rarely anywhere, 
except for publications of audit and consulting companies that create demand for tax risk 
                                                          
9 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 31(1). 
10 European Commission Fiscalis Risk Analysis Project Group, Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrations 
(2006)  
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxation/tax_cooperation/gen_overv
iew/risk_management_guide_for_tax_administrations_en.pdf > accessed 20 October 2018 
11 HM Revenue & Customers, Tax Compliance Risk Management (12 April 2016, updated 13 March 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/tax-compliance-risk-management> accessed 20 October 2018 
12 Australian Government Australian Taxation Office, Tax risk management and governance review guide (18 April 
2018) <https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Large-business/In-detail/Key-products-and-resources/Tax-risk-
management-and-governance-review-guide/> accessed 20 October 2018 
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management consulting services. In second and third chapters of thesis, I will analyse how 
enterprises can apply the same risk management methodology as tax administrations, first on the 
example of general PE risk management and then by addressing dependent agent PE risk 
specifically.  
Even though materials of consulting and auditing companies (primarily, Big Four accounting 
firms – EY, Deloitte, KPMG, PwC) do not represent the academic research, I cover their 
findings on PE tax risk management in detail for a couple of reasons. First, their research and 
scope of the services they offer set the trend and demand for services of tax risk management 
around the world. Second, findings of the external audit they conduct have a direct effect on the 
company, and thus, can have a significant preventative effect regarding tax avoidance. Third, 
“Big Four” and tax consulting companies regularly explore opinions of companies on managing 
tax risks in different jurisdictions and industries, and thus, provide most up-to-date information 
insights on how MNEs reach tax compliance goals. 
Due to confidentiality of the tax function, my research is theoretical, and does not include any 
practical review of internal documentation of companies. Instead, I am exploring the tax strategy 
documentation of Electrolux at the stage of researching tax risk management framework in 
chapter 2. There are a couple of reasons for choosing Electrolux as a target company for practical 
examples. First, it is a consumer electronics company with headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, 
which allows to analyse it under the umbrella of the EU law concepts and Nordic law. Second, it 
is known for its high level of corporate social responsibility: as of September 2018, it retained a 
leading position in Dow Jones Sustainability Indices. 13  Third, its corporate communications 
materials provide detailed insights on goals and principles of tax risk management in the 
company, as well as structure of its internal controls. 
                                                          
13 Electrolux Group, “Electrolux retains position as industry leader in Dow Jones Sustainability Indices” (13 
September 2018) <https://www.electroluxgroup.com/en/electrolux-retains-position-as-industry-leader-in-dow-jones-
sustainability-indices-26095/> accessed 20 October 2018 
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2. PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 
2.1.  Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to look into concept of permanent establishment under OECD 
Model Tax Convention and explore how it is further interpreted in regulatory sources (on 
the example of Finland). This introductory overview will help to define main elements of 
PE concepts, its sources and current trends of its development, especially challenges 
imposed by digitalisation and globalisation. This will create a solid basis for mapping tax 
risks arising from PE arrangements (chapter 2) and case analysis of distribution 
arrangement (chapter 3).  
First, I will start with analysis of sources that define PE at international and national levels. 
Then, I will identify the “global” concept of PE and its main elements. Next, I will look 
under changes to PE concept brought by BEPS Action 7. Finally, I will give concrete 
examples on interpretation of PE concept on the example of the Finnish law. 
2.2. Background of PE regulation 
PE is one of the most extensively analysed and constantly developing international tax 
concepts. Goal of PE can be summed up to allocating taxing rights between states and 
providing a threshold to exercise substantive jurisdiction.14 It is sometimes also called “the 
nexus rule” as it allows to determine jurisdiction to tax a non-resident enterprise when it 
carries activities in the other state (source state) through PE.15  This way, it ensures a 
compromise between residence-state taxation and source-state taxation.16  
“Concept of PE is still as valuable as it was more than 100 years ago”17 – this statement 
shows the long history of PE and non-decreasing importance of this concept. First attempts 
to regulate PE go back to the late 1800s, in the tax treaty between Austria-Hungary and 
Prussia 18 , as a way to react to growing interaction between the Central European 
                                                          
14 Karoline Spies, “Permanent Establishment versus Fixed Establishment: The Same or Different?” [2017] 
71(12) Bullet for International Taxation 706 
15 OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 2018) 168 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en> accessed 20 October 2018 
16 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
31 
17 Chris Finnerty et al, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IFBD, 2007) 48 
18 Michael Kobetsky, International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 
(Cambridge U. Press 2011) 109 
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countries 19  and economic development trends of industrial evolution era. 20  It appears 
almost since the first tax treaties in the beginning of the 20th century, at that time becoming 
equal to physical presence requirement.21 After the First World War, cross-border activities 
began to grow, as well as willingness of tax authorities to tax such transactions. This led 
the League of Nations to start developing PE concept in late 1920s to avoid impediments 
for trading relationships.22 At that time,  PE was defined as a list of examples of situations 
or business models that gave rise to taxation rights for the source state, namely “the real 
centres of management, affiliated companies, branches, factories, agencies, warehouses, 
offices, depots”. 23  These lists aimed to ensure source principle of taxation when 
jurisdiction to tax is based on the economic connection of an item of income to a country.24 
In 1956 the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) issued the first 
report to clarify PE concept. 25 In 1950s, PE was already defined on a more general level as 
“a fixed place of business in one of the territories in which the business of the enterprise is 
wholly or partly carried on”.26 Back then, the pillars of modern PE concept were framed in 
two mutually reinforcing movements, namely the definition of PEs and the attribution of 
profits to them. 27 Goals of promoting international commerce and reaching administrative 
simplicity further limited the rights of source countries and facilitated fragmentation of 
activities to avoid having a taxable presence.28  
Analysis of history of PE concept development allows to understand one of its key 
challenges in the 21st century. Namely, PE concept was created and developed as a 
                                                          
19 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
15 
20 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
65 
21 Vishesh Dhuldhoya, “The Future of the Permanent Establishment Concept” [2018] 72 (4a) Bulletin for 
International Taxation IBFD (accessed 5 March 2018) 
22 Lara Friedlander and Scott  Wilkie, “Policy Forum – The history of tax Treaty Provisions and why it is 
important to know about it” [2006] 54 (4) Canadian Tax Journal 909 
23 Raffaele Petruzzi, “The Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment as an Extension of the Permanent 
Establishment Concept of Article 5(1) of the OECD Model Convention” 35 in Michael Lang (ed), Dependent 
Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014)  
24 Michael Kobetsky, International Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Principles and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 29 
25 Raffaele Petruzzi, “The Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment as an Extension of the Permanent 
Establishment Concept of Article 5(1) of the OECD Model Convention” 35 in Michael Lang (ed), Dependent 
Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 
26 Raffaele Petruzzi, “The Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment as an Extension of the Permanent 
Establishment Concept of Article 5(1) of the OECD Model Convention” 35 in Michael Lang (ed), Dependent 
Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 
27 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status (United Nations, September 2014) 
21 <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP2/Paper_PE_Status.pdf > accessed 20 October 2018  
28 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status (United Nations, September 2014) 
21 <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP2/Paper_PE_Status.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018 
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legislative reaction to industrial revolution and therefore emphasises permanence and 
physically located business sites.29 Even though the scope of PE taxation was gradually 
narrowed down to the detriment of source country,30 later discussion will show that this 
trend is not as simple to evaluate as it may seem. Namely, digitalisation erodes the basic 
idea of PE as a physically fixed place, and at the same time, globalisation allows 
enterprises to become more skilful in implementing cross-border tax planning 
arrangements. Also, history analysis allows to identify the internal conflict of PE role in 
ensuring tax revenue and at the same supporting cross-border trade. 
Definition of PE differs country to country. However, there are certain sources that allow 
to define main criteria of PE at the international level. Notion of stability of the taxpayer's 
activities is a key to interpret PE concept as it justifies taxing in the source country on the 
profits attributed to such activities. 31 In other words, the home state will prevail, unless the 
taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the host state.32 However, for MNE entering the 
new markets, understanding the basic idea of PE concept is not enough. In other words, 
MNE needs to clearly comprehend the hierarchy of sources of hard and soft law defining 
PE concept, be able to define which source applies and which trends define its application. 
For these reasons, I will proceed with overview of PE concept sources and its main 
principles and explore the complex interplay between role of double taxation agreements 
and domestic law in defining PE threshold. 
2.3. Sources of PE regulation 
The starting point for analysis is Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (further 
referred to as “OECD Model Tax Convention” or “OECD Model”). OECD Model is the 
basis for countries to negotiate and apply bilateral tax treaties (more than 3,000 already33) 
between countries, assist business and at the same time help to prevent tax evasion and 
avoidance.34 The 2017 edition of the OECD Model is a result of consolidation of the 
                                                          
29 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
70 
30 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
101 
31 Esther Villa, “Multinational groups and permanent establishment issues” [2006] 7(2) Business Law 
International 184 
32 Esther Villa, “Multinational groups and permanent establishment issues” [2006] 7(2) Business Law 
International 184 
33 Tax treaties: update to OECD Model Tax Convention released (OECD, 18 December 2017) 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/tax-treaties-2017-update-to-oecd-model-tax-convention-released.htm> 
accessed 27 October 2018 
34 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (OECD Publishing, 
2017) <https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en> accessed 20 October 2018 
 9 
 
treaty-related measures under OECD/G20 BEPS Project that exploited loopholes in tax 
rules to artificially shift profits to tax heavens.35 The OECD Commentary of the Model 
Tax Convention (Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital), further referred to as 
the OECD Commentary, OECD Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, 2008 and 2010; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 2010; and supplementary BEPS report are the 
starting point to define concept of PE.36 The income of a PE can be allocated according to 
the OECD Report on The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments of 2010. 
Double taxation agreements (DTAs) in its turn provide case-by-case interpretation of PE 
concept implemented in international taxation situations (see Chart 1). It is ultimately 
important to clearly define and understand this concept to guarantee that source states do 
not lose revenue that otherwise they could have collected, if DTA did not exist.37 DTAs 
fall under the scope of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties which imposes good-
faith requirement (Article 31(1)) on interpretation of treaty terms in the range of 
reasonably foreseeable meanings. However, MNEs should be prepared for deviations due 
to linguistic peculiarities, wording of PE definition (especially when DTAs are drafted in 
several languages) and practice of its application.38 It is important to remember that PE 
principle interpretation reflects the political views prevalent in international community.39 
Developing countries have additional goals when negotiating and signing DTAs. They aim 
to provide foreign investors with security regarding taxation regime, not only relief from 
double taxation.40 All in all, content of DTA's is significantly influenced by language, 
peculiarities of legal system and case law, political and economic goals of the state in 
question.  
                                                          
35 Base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2018) <http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/>  accessed 20 October 
2018 
36 General Guidelines for the Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishment (VERO, 30 April 2018) 
<https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-guidance/guidance/59583/general-guidelines-for-the-attribution-of-income-
to-permanent-establishment2/> accessed 10 October 2018, further referred to as “General Guidelines for 
the Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishment 2018” 
37 Luis M. Almeida and Perrine Toledano, Understanding how the various definitions of Permanent 
Establishment can limit the taxation ability of resource- rich source countries (CCSI Briefing Note, March 
2018) 5 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/03/Optimizing-the-PE-clause-for-resource-riche-source-state-
CCSI-2018-2.pdf > accessed 20 October 2018 
38 Reimer, Ekkehart, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-15. 
39 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
13 
40 Lee-Ann Steenkamp,"The permanent establishment concept in double tax agreements between developed 
and developing countries: Canada/South Africa as a case in point." [2014] 13(3) The International Business 
& Economics Research Journal 539 citing Eric Neumayer, “Do double taxation treaties increase foreign 
direct investment to developing countries?” [2007] 43(8) The Journal of Development Studies 1503  
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Chart 1. Application of double taxation agreements41 
When there is no bilateral treaty between home and source states, domestic law provisions 
will define whether PE exists. Only in cases when all attempts to interpret PE concept 
based on language or context of DTAs have failed, one may revert to domestic law.42 
Jurisdictions may take either quantitative (focus on the extent of activities, turnover, 
number of transactions, duration) or qualitative (focus on commercial nature of activity) 
approach to assessing presence of PE.43 In some countries, OECD definition of PE is 
incorporated in domestic legislation, but domestic laws frequently are more onerous than a 
DTA definition of a PE might be, under equivalent economic circumstances, as business 
community notes. 44  OECD Member countries considerably vary in domestic tax law 
provisions on PEs. 45  Noticeable deviations include definitions of service PEs, adding 
further examples in the list of possible PEs and differences in interpreting what constitutes 
                                                          
41 Luis M. Almeida and Perrine Toledano, Understanding how the various definitions of Permanent 
Establishment can limit the taxation ability of resource- rich source countries (CCSI Briefing Note, March 
2018) 5 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/03/Optimizing-the-PE-clause-for-resource-riche-source-state-
CCSI-2018-2.pdf > accessed 20 October 2018 
42 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC – 6 
43 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
276 
44 Fuad S. Saba, “Permanent Establishment Risk in the Global Mobility Context” (Global Tax Network, July 
2014)   <https://www.gtn.com/newsletter-2014-07.php> accessed 20 October 2018  
45 OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Discussion 
Draft on the Attribution of Profits to permanent Establishments DAFFE/CFA(2001)28/CONF (OECD, 2001) 
4 <https://www-oecd-ilibrary-org.libproxy.helsinki.fi/docserver/9789264184527-
en.pdf?expires=1537903768&id=id&accname=ocid194948&checksum=467C7F57420C8FE5F6A3322C2A
B15AB8> accessed 20 October 2018  
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preparatory or auxiliary activities.46 Also, states may define activities that constitute two or 
more PEs under tax treaty as just one PE under applicable domestic law.47 It shows that 
MNE should take into account not only literal wording of PE concept but also the theory, 
history and politics behind PE concept in the state where it is functioning. Later in this 
chapter, I will explore domestic law sources of PE regulation in more detail on the example 
of Finland. 
Analysis of sources of PE concept regulation shows that we can consider OECD Model 
Tax Convention as a starting point for defining PE concept, as it will allow to map us 
possible points of discrepancies in state-specific application. However, before I turn to 
current definition, I would like to start with analysis of principles of international taxation 
that define both the approach to PE concept and direction in which it evolves.  
2.4.  Principles and goals in regulation of international taxation 
The overarching reason for introduction of PE concept is “the avoidance of double taxation 
in order to reduce tax obstacles to cross-border services, trade and investment”. It means 
that existing double taxation risks is the primary tax policy concern.48 Main part of OECD 
Model defines extent of income taxation by each of two Contracting States and ways to 
eliminate international juridical double taxation.49 
Certain tax policy considerations and principles have historically defined evolution of 
taxation systems, namely:50  
• Neutrality: “Taxation should seek to be neutral and equitable between forms of 
business activities.” 
• Efficiency: minimisation of compliance costs. 
• Certainty and simplicity: clear and simple to understand tax rules, as complexity 
favours aggressive tax planning. 
                                                          
46 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD-MC7-8 
47 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD-MC7-8 
48  OECD.Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (OECD Publishing, 
2017) 13 https://doi.org/10.1787/mtc_cond-2017-en. 2017> accessed 20 October 2018, further referred to as 
2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital  
49 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 15 
50OECD, "Fundamental principles of taxation", in Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 
(OECD Publishing, 2014) 30 <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264218789-5-en> accessed 20 October 2018  
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• Flexibility: dynamic taxation systems keeping pace with technological and 
commercial developments. 
• Equity: horizontal equity meaning that taxpayers in similar circumstances have a 
similar tax burden, vertical equity meaning variation of taxation regime based on 
volume of income, and inter-nation equity, aiming to guarantee each country an 
equitable tax revenue share from cross-border transactions.51 
These principles are strongly based on goals of OECD – enhancing tax transparency, 
addressing tax avoidance, promoting tax policies for strong, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, supporting tax as a tool for development.52 The lack of clarity would discourage 
MNEs from engaging in countries with unclear taxation rules and will therefore discourage 
and delay foreign investment.53 Also practicability is a guiding principle and a benchmark 
for interpreting treaty terms.54 OECD members state that simplicity, administrability and 
sound tax policy are their primary goals.55  
In continuation of OECD Model goals, PE concept serves three main goals. First, it is a 
part of a broader picture of ensuring international justice in assigning substantial profits to 
the respective source state.56 Second, it ensures neutrality between the different forms of 
establishments that foreign investors can choose as PE concept puts foreign investors at an 
equal footing with a local entrepreneur.57 Third, PE concept aims at minimising unneeded 
compliance and administration costs of auditing entities that are not present in a respective 
state.58 All in all, main objective of PE is to reconcile interests of international justice and 
practical feasibility to simplify cross-border taxation. Understanding underlying principles 
                                                          
51 OECD, "Fundamental principles of taxation", in Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 
(OECD Publishing, 2014) 30-31 <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264218789-5-en> accessed 20 October 2018 
52 OECD Work on Taxation (OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration,2018) 7-8 
<https://www.oecd.org/tax/centre-for-tax-policy-and-administration-brochure.pdf> accessed 20 October 
2018  
53 BIAC response to the OECD Model Tax Convention: Revised Proposals Concerning the  
Interpretation and Application of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) (BIAC, 31 January 2013) 5 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/PERMESTBIAC.pdf> accessed 9 November 2018 
54 Reimer, Ekkehart, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC - 87 
55 Robert Feischreiber, and Margaret Kent, "Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment" [2000] 2 
Corporate Business Taxation Monthly 15 
56 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-11 
57 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-12 
58 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-12 
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helps us to comprehend how these goals can be achieved and what changes to legislation 
we can expect. 
Any failure to correctly address rapidly evolving business arrangements under PE model 
can lead to following situations:  
(i) minimal taxation (if taxable income resides in a low-tax jurisdiction);  
(ii) double non-taxation of profits (if the domestic law treaties of the source and 
residence countries do not cover this situation), which could be considered treaty 
abuse; or 
(iii) double taxation (worldwide taxation in one country and source taxation in the 
other).59 
Analysing principles of PE concept regulation and consequences of establishing an 
ineffective PE threshold shows how important it is for international community to regulate 
PE taxation coherently, and for MNEs to keep up with the regulatory trends. OECD Model 
Tax Convention sets the general standard how states define PE in tax treaties and domestic 
law,60 so I will focus on how it sets PE threshold. 
2.5. PE concept under OECD Model Tax Convention 
I have explored the significant role of OECD Model Tax Convention that sets the goals, 
principles and mechanisms of international taxation. I will address the wording of OECD 
Model together with positions provided in OECD Commentary, as both these documents 
have a status of OECD Recommendations – soft low obligations imposed by OECD on its 
Member States.61  
Under Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, permanent 
establishment is defined as “a fixed place of business through which the business of 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on”.6263 Main role of PE concept is “to determine the 
right of a Contracting State to tax the profits of an enterprise of the other Contracting 
                                                          
59Jean-François Dutriez, “Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment of a Company Engaged in 
Online Sales of Goods through a Local Warehouse” [2018] 25(3) International Transfer Pricing Journal 185 
60 Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (OECD, 18 December 2017) 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-condensed-version-
20745419.htm> accessed 10 November 2018  
61 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC – 20 
62 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 30 
63 See Annex 1 for detailed wording and structure breakdown. 
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State”, as Article 7a of OECD Model prevents a Contracting State from taxing the profits 
of an enterprise of the other Contracting State unless it carries on its business through PE 
established therein.64 In other words, PE creates taxable presence for purposes of corporate 
income taxation (“CIT”). The language in Article 5(1) suggests that there is a PE when 
objective criteria are satisfied, living no room for taxpayer choice.65 By this definition, 
OECD Model creates a legal fiction (an assertion for regulatory purposes) of PE as a  
“separate and independent enterprise” or of a “distinct and separate enterprise.” 66  It 
indicates a particular level of business activity in the Source State, starting from archetypal 
“physical” PE.67 PE is not a legal entity in the source state, but is an “extension” of an 
entity legally existing in the residence (home) state.68  
 
Chart 2. PE concept 
When analysing PE concept, general questions that MNE should answer when planning 
activities abroad and that are answered by OECD Model Tax Convention, are: 
• What is a fixed place of business?  
• Whose place of business? 
• What constitutes a dependent agent and what scope of its activities fall under PE?  
                                                          
64 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 116 
65 Clifton Fleming, “A Note on the Zimmer Case and the Concept of Permanent Establishment” [2011] Tax 
Treaty Case Law around the Globe 109 SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2079317> accessed 20 October 
2018  
66 Charles Lincoln, “Approaches to Attribution of Profits in International Corporate Permanent 
Establishments’ Taxable Separate Entities” [2017] 22(30) Trinity Law review SSRN 2 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919387> accessed 20 October 2018  
67 Leonardo Castro, "Problems Involving Permanent Establishments: Overview of Relevant Issues in Today's 
International Economy." [2011] 2 Global Business Law Review 126-127  
68 Jean-François Dutriez, “Attribution of Profits to a Permanent Establishment of a Company Engaged in 
Online Sales of Goods through a Local Warehouse” [2018] 25(3) International Transfer Pricing Journal 186 
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• What attention should be given to inconsistent use of clauses in a bilateral and 
multilateral treaties?69 
Under Article 5 Commentary, PE definition consists of following conditions: 
1. Existence of a “place of business”. Under Article 5, it is any premises, facilities or 
installations at the factual disposal of the enterprise used to carry on business. Any 
substantial, physical object (including parts of the enterprise) which is commercially 
suitable to be a basis for a business activity will fall under “place of business”. 70 “Place” 
can be any location, constituting a coherent unit both in commercial and geographical 
senses in relation to a particular business.71 Under tradition approach, “place” means one 
or more tangible assets used to carry business, and cannot include exclusively a bunch of 
intangible assets, such as an internet site.72 The need for a geographical link (“location 
test”73) and a certain duration are important elements of PE concept, but their actual 
application is flexible and sometimes inconsistent. 74  In practice, digital economy 
development challenges the traditional concept of “place” as will be discussed further. 
Term “business” allows to exclude passive investments from PE concept scope, as well as 
active income received on an occasional and low-scale basis.75 One may get confused by 
misleading terminological difference between “enterprise” and “business”. Even though 
“enterprise” may refer to legal entity as institution and its status and “business” means 
concrete activities performed by the enterprise and its employees, this distinction is not 
consistent.76 In such situation, taxpayer should be ready to refer to DTAs, domestic law 
and case law for a sufficient level of detail. The concept of “place of business” as shown in 
2.2., emerged historically at the time of industrial revolution and is now challenged by 
                                                          
69 Craig Elliffe, “Meaning of ‘Permanent Establishment’ in Article 5 of Double Tax Conventions” [2010] 
16(1) New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy SSRN <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1625603> 
accessed 20 October 2018 
70 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
123 
71 OECD, 2002 Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Issues in International Taxation, No. 8 
(OECD Publishing, 2002) 77 <https://doi-org.libproxy.helsinki.fi/10.1787/9789264099920-en> accessed 20 
October 2018  
72 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-37-38 
73 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 1991) 
151 
74 OECD, 2002 Reports Related to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Issues in International Taxation, No. 8 
(OECD Publishing, 2002) 76 <https://doi-org.libproxy.helsinki.fi/10.1787/9789264099920-en> accessed 20 
October 2018 
75 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-40 
76 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-40 
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globalisation and digitalisation trends, as further discussion will show. However, it remains 
the starting criterion to define PE threshold, which MNEs should analyse with care, 
especially its temporal and locational aspects.  
2.“Fixed” nature of the place of business. Business profits are taxed in the source state 
only when an enterprise reaches a certain degree of permanence (not purely temporary 
nature) at a fixed place, to which an enterprise has a link and where business activities 
have certain intensity.7778 “Fixed” reflects the strong link between the land and the taxing 
powers of the state in many distributive rules of OECD Model, in order to establish 
jurisdiction of the source state, simplify cross-border activities and empower source state 
tax authorities with control and audit powers.79 In other words, goal of a “fixed place” 
concept is to provide certainty both for taxpayers and for tax authorities and at the same 
time to guarantee enforceability of tax liabilities.80 A place of business may, however, 
amount to PE even when it exists only for a very short period of time just due to the short-
term nature of activities in general.81 It shows that concept of “fixed” requires qualitative 
analysis by authorities, that are to define PE threshold on case-by-case basis, and may 
come to unpredictable conclusions. 
3.“At the disposal of enterprise”. This condition is not explicit in OECD Model Tax 
Convention, but is stated and explained in its Commentary which elaborates on use of 
“through” wording of OECD Model.8283 This criterion implies both test of the control of 
taxpayer over deemed PE and functional integration of PE into the business model of the 
enterprise.84 Either legal title or factual circumstances can constitute the basis for control.85 
Namely, mere fact of having a certain amount of space at its disposal for business activities 
is sufficient to constitute a place of business, even if the enterprise has no formal legal 
                                                          
77 Harald Moshammer and Michael Tumpel, Attribution of Profits to a Dependent Agent PE in Michael Lang 
(ed) Dependent Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 243  
78 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 121 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 22) 
79 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC - 37 
80 Tobias Hagemann, “Attribution of Profits Derived Before or After the Existence of a Permanent 
Establishment under Tax Treaty Law” [2017] 10(29) Journal of Management and Financial Sciences 197 
81 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 122 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 28) 
82 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC - 58 
83 Harald Moshammer andMichael Tumpel, Attribution of Profits to a Dependent Agent PE in Michael Lang 
(ed) Dependent Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 243 
84 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC -58, 62 
85 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016)  OECD MC - 59 
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right to this space.86 In general, the taxpayer will be deemed to have place of disposal at his 
disposal only when he can employ it at his discretion.87  
All in all, threshold for considering a certain arrangement to be “at the disposal of 
enterprise” is low, as it is based on factual business arrangements, that are difficult not to 
find in any cross-border operation. In practice, it also causes uncertainties. Namely, IFBD 
Research Staff point out that OECD explains the concept of the place being “at the 
disposal of the enterprise” through examples that cannot cover all the possible real-life 
example and thus do not replace the need to provide a definition of “at the disposal”.88 
4. “Permanent”. The term “permanent establishment” itself contains the fourth feature, 
permanence as temporal stability of business arrangement.89 This concept is relative, and is 
assessed together with such factors as location of the activity and number of clients.90 
Some believe that OECD Model Tax Convention provides a rule of thumb, under which  
there is no PE when place of business was maintained for less than 6 months.91 In practice, 
when assessing “permanence” in relation to their business arrangements, taxpayers should 
be ready to face the case when DTAs do not contain any explicit time rules on what 
constitutes “permanency”.92 This makes the permanence criterium the most vague among 
those we analysed, creating a basis for unpredictable interpretation by legislators and tax 
authorities. 
It is also important to highlight the role of causal connection in determining existence of 
PE. Only the economic connection, expressed through a causal link between a PE and the 
income, should be determining for allocation to a PE. 93  As the causation principle is 
independent from time restrictions, there is a question whether income is caused by a PE, 
respectively the activity carried on therein. 94  However, causal connection is more 
                                                          
86 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 118 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 11) 
87 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC - 60 
88 Interpretation and Application of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (IFBD, 2012) 4 <http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/49782184.pdf> accessed 9 November 2018  
89 Ekkehart Reimer, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC-50 
90 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 
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91 Chris Finnerty et al, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning (IFBD, 2007) 40 
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93 Tobias Hagemann, “Attribution of Profits Derived Before or After the Existence of a Permanent 
Establishment under Tax Treaty Law” [2017] 10(29) Journal of Management and Financial Sciences 205 
94 Tobias Hagemann, “Attribution of Profits Derived Before or After the Existence of a Permanent 
Establishment under Tax Treaty Law” [2017] 10(29) Journal of Management and Financial Sciences 205 
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important at the stage of profit attribution as it comprises procedural aspect of PE concept, 
which is outside the scope of this research. 
Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Convention also defines following: 
• Examples of PE (a place of management, a branch, an office, a workshop, or place 
of extraction of natural resources; building site or construction or installation 
project lasting more than 12 months). Namely, the list stated in Article 5(4) 
identifies four types of requirements: elements related to the primary activity (use 
and maintenance), location-related elements (facilities, stocks, fixed places of 
business), object-related elements (goods, information, merchandise) and elements 
describing intended activity (storage, display and delivery).95 
• List of preparatory or auxiliary arrangements that do not fall under PE scope, 
primarily based on purpose criteria (to combat international tax planning that 
erodes the sovereignty of the market country96). For correct application of PE 
concept, it is vitally important to distinguish such activities from the core business 
activities.97 
• Dependent agent concept as a separate type of PE (further addressed in chapter 3 of 
the thesis on example of distribution models).  
PE concept under Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Convention can be split into several types, 
based on nature of activities performed by PE and nature of relationship between company 
and its PE. Schwarz identifies two types of PE: physical PE and agency PE.98 Consulting 
community proposes a more detailed classification of PE, which can provide MNEs with 
more detailed understanding whether their business arrangements or steps in value chain 
fall under scope of PE.99100  
                                                          
95 Reimer, Ekkehart, Stefan Schmid, and Marianne Orell, Permanent Establishments: A Domestic Taxation, 
Bilateral Tax Treaty and OECD Perspective (5th edn, Kluwer Law International, 2016) OECD MC - 89 
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Chart 3. Practically oriented breakdown of PE definition under OECD Model Tax 
Convention101 
Based on the public comments received on the 2017 draft update, 102  an additional 
paragraph was added to separate PE treatment for profit taxation from the treatment of a 
foreign company for VAT/GST purposes, including from the cases when a foreign 
enterprise has registered for VAT/GST purposes.103 However, this research focuses only 
on PE concept for income tax purposes. 
Analysis of compound elements and types of PE allows us to structure observations on 
changes to PE concept, as well as identify risks that stem from incoherent interpretation of 
PE across jurisdictions. The main goal of explicit definition of PE is to provide certainty 
and simplicity (see 2.4). However, challenges in modern economy create the need to 
amend the definition of PE, and thus, put the legal certainty at risk. Most recent and 
notable case of PE concept reform are BEPS actions that will be analysed below. 
2.6. Impact of BEPS Actions and MLI on PE concept 
                                                          
101 PwC, The Past, Present and Future of Permanent Establishment (September 2017) 9 
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20 October 2018  
 20 
 
“You can see BEPS as a set of rules, or you can see it as a milieu, a general change in the 
way tax is viewed,” business community notes.104 BEPS action reflects the willingness of 
tax authorities to come up with a common approach to address new tax avoidance 
technologies that were enabled by globalisation and digitalisation. Namely, newer business 
models such as digital marketplaces, online catalogues and portals allow taxpayers to 
generate income in a country with minimal or no physical presence in that country.105 
These new challenges have opened up ways for MNEs to minimise their tax burdens and 
created the need for prompt action to prevent regulatory gaps. 106 The OECD/G20 countries 
adopted an Action Plan in 2013 as part of the BEPS Project.107 It was the first time that all 
OECD and G20 countries united to design common responses to challenges of 
international taxation.108  In October 2015, more than 12,000 pages of comments and 13 
reports had been published. 109  This work resulted in publishing 15 actions to equip 
governments with domestic and international instruments to address tax avoidance. 110  
These instruments are aimed to enforce the core principle of BEPS initiative - “Taxation 
where value is created”.111  
BEPS Actions resulted in amending OECD Model Tax Convention and its interpretation. 
Namely, Article 5 of OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary to it underwent a 
number of changes in 2017 to clarify interpretation of the Article, in light of Report on 
Action 7 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project.112 Goal of OECD 
was to update definition of permanent establishment (PE) to prevent abuses that allowed to 
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avoid the tax nexus.113114 As a result, BEPS Action 7 has lowered PE threshold (conditions 
under which a business model will be considered PE) which is evident from following 
changes: 
• adoption of a broader agency PE rule;115 
• a narrower interpretation of the “preparatory and auxiliary” exception; 116 
• revision of dependent agent PE concept aimed to address the avoidance of Article 
5 through "commissionaire arrangements";117 
• the adoption of an anti-fragmentation rule118. Goal of this addition was to prevent 
enterprises to split their business activities in the same countries in smaller pieces 
to claim PE exceptions due to “preparatory or auxiliary nature” of such fragmented 
activities. 119 
Some believe that lowered threshold is predictable based on amendments made to the 
Commentaries on the OECD Model over the years. Such signals were the addition of the 
painter example, the incorporation of provisions in the OECD Commentary on e-
commerce, arrival of the optional services PE clause and the OECD’s work on the 
Discussion Draft on PEs of 2012.120 However, it is increasingly likely under article 5 of the 
OECD Model (2017) PE will be identified in cases where none would have been 
considered it before.121 Namely, changes brought by BEPS Actions introduce reference to 
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different tax avoidance activities and business arrangements (e.g., “commissionaire 
agreements”) that are likely to receive incoherent interpretation based on specifics of legal 
systems and economic goals. Thus, these changes have a serious impact on legal certainty 
in the sphere of double taxation and should be addressed duly by MNEs. To support is 
interpretation of PE concept and simplify it in terms of PE procedural aspects, OECD have 
issued Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, 
BEPS Action 7 22 March 2018. 122 I will analyse it further in the third chapter of thesis. 
Finally, it is important to explore the actual stages to implement changes to OECD. In 
November 2016, over 100 states finalised negotiations on the Multilateral Convention to 
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(""MLI") that entered into force on 1st July 2018. Its goal is to swiftly implement a series 
of tax treaty measures to strengthen response of international tax rules to tax avoidance. 
Taxpayers should also take into account potential overlay of MLI with existing treaties and 
be ready to re-evaluate potential PEs in light of anti-fragmentation rule and principal 
purpose test (whether the primary goal of transaction was just to obtain the treaty 
benefit).123 
2.7. PE concept at supranational level: EU case 
This research focuses on PE risk management for European MNEs functioning in 
telecommunications sector, meaning that they fall under the EU law. PE regulation on EU 
level is notably shaped by freedoms of the EU, namely freedom of establishment (case 
07/16/1998, C-264-96, Imperial Chemical Industries—ICI). 124  The EU is facing same 
challenges as many other states outside the EU. Namely, digital businesses rely heaving on 
intangible goods, data transfers and automation that minimise the need of physical 
presence in the market country and actually allow to avoid physical presence. 125  126  
Inappropriateness of traditional PE for taxing threshold was exposed already in 1991 even 
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before world faced true implications of digital revolution.127  Now it is a hot question 
whether governments should reconsider this traditional concept of PE as physical presence 
or whether there is a need to come up with some other form of source taxation.128  
MNEs functioning in the digital economy era share specific features in their business 
approach: they rely significantly on information and communication technologies, focus on 
operating intellectual property assets and tend to aggregate value creation chain.129 To keep 
up with changes to business models, the EU introduced a new nexus concept, under which 
taxing rights may be allocated based on fulfilment of certain quantitative conditions 
necessary to substantiate “a significant digital footprint”.130 The EU Council stated that “an 
appropriate nexus in the form of a virtual permanent establishment  which would take into 
account where value is created in the different business models of the digital economy, 
should be explored” (15175/17).131  
The EU is also addressing hybrid PE in light of implementation of the BEPS package.132 
Subsequently, the Group also agreed on “soft law” guidance on hybrid permanent 
establishment (PE) mismatches involving two EU Member States, when one of the states 
considers it PE, and another state finds it to be a PE.133 However, there was almost no signs 
of implementation efforts by EU Member States, and as a result, the Council invited the 
Group to properly monitor implementation from 2016 onwards.134 
It shows that the legislative plans of the EU answers global trends to address base erosion 
and ensure efficient taxation of digitalised business. The EU has been slow in 
implementing measures at first, but now authorities are focusing on pushing 
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implementation forward. For MNEs, it would mean increased interest of tax authorities to 
conduct risk assessment of enterprises and update taxation guidelines in line with the EU 
aspirations. 
2.8. PE concept in national laws: Finland case 
By bringing example of Finnish legislation, I would like to show how PE concept is 
practically implemented in national regulation and double taxation treaties of a certain state. 
This would allow me to map main risks that should be considered when planning PE 
strategy (addressed in the second chapter). 
National legal rules on foreigners' tax liability are present in § 9, § 10 and § 13a, Income 
Tax Act (TVL), and in § 83, Act on Assessment Procedure (laki verotusmenettelystä, 
VML).135 Namely, definition provided in § 13a of TVL, consists of two parts. First part 
gives a short definition of PE as a “separate place of business for the purpose of carrying 
out business activities permanently or where different arrangements are taken”.136 Out of 
OECD Model criteria, this definition focuses only on two: “place of business” and 
“permanence”. This potentially means lower PE threshold rather than under OECD Model, 
as there is no requirement for place to be “fixed” (from temporary point of view) or “at the 
disposal of enterprise”). The second part of definition lists examples of PE without 
classifying these types or providing their key identifying features. In addition to multiple 
bilateral treaties, Finland is also a part to Nordic Tax Treaty, which Article 5 defines PE 
same as OECD Model Tax Convention.137 The guidelines and case law do not lay down 
what period of time is sufficient to create permanence, so it is determined on a case-by-
case basis.138 In practice, carrying out or trade in Finland without a PE is difficult.139 
However, the official guidance on the PE concept of tax treaties is rather limited, it is 
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provided only on a general level and is mostly based on the OECD Commentary.140 As a 
result, PE research is focusing on analysing separate cases when certain business models 
were considered PE (see the table below) without systematising or interpreting their key 
features. 
Table 1. Finnish legislation and case law on determining permanent establishment141 
May constitute PE May not constitute PE (if only single 
criterium is satisfied) 
“computer operating as a server” 
“fixed ticket office” 
a person “making decision concerning the 
company per procuration” 
“board of directors” with “bookkeeping and 
auditing … done in Finland” 
“task of taking orders” (agency PE) 
 
“mere export” 
“business… through a mobile place of 
business, e.g. operating transportation with 
a truck or bus” 
“a mere bank account” 
 
 
Article 5 of the Model Tax Treaty of the OECD is a standard that governs the definitions 
of a PE in the tax treaties with Finland. Finland has reserved a right to use previous version 
of paragraphs 5, 6 (meaning versions before the 2017 update of the OECD Model), and not 
to include paragraphs 4.1 and 8 in its conventions.142 Tax treaties may vary in how details 
of PE concept are defined. For Finland, § 13 a, Income Tax Act provides a key domestic 
law definition of PE.143 Most of Finland’s tax treaties are based on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, whereas tax treaties with developing countries may have certain elements 
from the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries.144 The PE list may slightly differ in treaties.145  
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Tax control performed by the Finnish Tax Administration in relation to domestic and 
foreign corporate entities consists of assessment procedure, tax audits, taxpayer guidance, 
monitoring of tax payments and exchange of information between Finnish and foreign tax 
authorities. 146 Analysis has shown that Finnish legislation and case defines presence of PE 
on a case-by-case basis. For MNEs it would mean that their business arrangements would 
undergo qualitative analysis that may focus on unpredictable scope of factors. To ensure 
efficient cooperation with tax authorities, it is vital for MNEs to invest sufficient amount of 
time and resources into PE risk management. 
2.9. Conclusions 
Analysis of principles of international taxation regulation and main goals of OECD Model 
Tax Convention has highlighted the complex role of PE concept which is balancing 
between ensuring tax revenue for tax authorities and favourable tax regime for taxpayers 
without double taxation risk. Keeping this balance in practice, especially in light of 
challenges brought by business models of digital economy, is not an easy task for a 
legislator. Namely, OECD has reacted to digitalisation and globalisation by amending PE 
definition under BEPS Actions, which brought the legal uncertainty for MNEs, especially 
when different countries implement changes at different pace. It makes detailed awareness 
of PE concept vital for planning and performing operations cross-borders, as well as for 
effective cooperation with tax authorities. 
In light of this, when a business is entering a foreign market, it should answer a few basic 
questions to estimate whether PE will be created:   
Is there a tax treaty between the company’s home country and the foreign 
jurisdiction? In case if treaty exists, the taxpayer should be ready to analyse the language 
and definitions that determine whether PE exists. If there is no treaty, the primary object of 
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the analysis will be domestic tax law which may be less favourable than OECD Model 
provisions.147 
What are type of activities of the business, its employees and third parties may trigger 
PE? What is the scope of the “fixed place of business definition” under applicable 
sources of PE concept? Answer to these questions will allow to estimate whether specific 
business arrangements and stages of value chain of enterprise will fall under PE. The 
broader the scope of “fixed place” definition is, the more likely it is that the business deals 
with low PE threshold, where, for instance, employee cross-border mobility may easily 
raise PE. 148 
Is “permanence” test of PE created by continuous presence in the country in line with 
certain time threshold? In this aspect, the enterprise should be prepared for possible 
aggregate and complex models of calculating the presence in source country (e.g. in case 
of China).149 
Finding answers to these questions is not an easy task due to many reasons: ongoing 
changes to PE concepts, multitude of jurisdictions involved, as well as time and resource 
constraints faced by tax function. For this reason, it is important to identify risks of failing 
to identify PE existence in business arrangements, prioritise PE risks and address them 
promptly. In next chapter, I will look into how PE risk management, including building tax 
controls as a part of tax governance framework can help to structure corporate knowledge 
on cross-border PE taxation and ensure efficiency in reaching tax compliance and tax 
governance goals of MNE.   
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3. ADDRESSING PE RISK THROUGH TAX RISK MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
Analysis performed in chapter 1 has equipped with understanding of rationale of PE 
concept, its goals, compound elements and challenges to it brought by digitalisation and 
globalisation. This chapter will provide an overview of PE risk management focusing on 
consumer electronics industry. To be able to focus on PE risk management, it is important 
to first define concepts of tax compliance, tax governance and tax management. Then, I 
will identify stages of tax risk management and apply them for defining PE tax risk 
management procedures for MNEs performing cross-border business activities. 
I analyse PE risk management framework on the example of telecommunications industry 
with the focus on consumer electronics. This allows to track how changes of digital 
economy and globalisation impacts the value chain of electronics production and 
distribution, as well as creates new challenges for enterprises to identify changing 
provisions of PE taxation regime.  
3.2. Tax governance and tax compliance as basis for PE tax risk management 
In this research, I focus on tax challenges presented by PE risk to telecommunications 
industry with focus on consumer electronics, such as home equipment, TV, radio systems 
and mobile phones. In such enterprises, value chain includes multiple jurisdictions, and 
ways of communicating with employees, customers and consumers are sufficiently 
digitalised. In addition to that, a global span of business activities means ambitions to enter 
new markets or try new business models, as well as involvement of multiple persons in 
functions that have impact on tax management planning.  
There is a certain controversy in taxation of MNEs. National tax authorities, on the one 
hand, admit that telecommunications industry are important for growth, partially because 
of consumer welfare, but on the other hand, see them as a good source of revenues due to 
increasing turnover.150 At the same time, tax authorities are challenge by keeping up with 
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changes in technology that blur the lines between several sectors, such as information 
services, enhanced services, and telecommunications.151 
Based on this, we can identify three main challenges for telecommunications sector:  
1. Taxation becomes a strategic concern with broader stakeholder focus.  
2. Regulators become more demanding when it comes to transparency, board engagement 
and requirements to control systems to align conflicting interests in taxing 
telecommunications sector. 
3. Organisations are transforming their commercial strategies, support functions and 
application of new technologies.152 
Taxation regulations that pose challenges for telecommunications companies are driven by 
the goal of identifying and preventing tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning strategies. 
Concepts of tax avoidance and tax planning which tax governance aims to prevent varies a 
lot between countries and depends on form of an arrangement, attitudes of courts, 
government, legislature and public opinion. 153 The new philosophy of transparent tax 
competition (that can even amount to a totally new “global tax order”154) and cooperation 
between tax authorities and business should be reflected in a change of mentality, uniting 
good tax compliance with mechanisms to measure good corporate governance. 155 
Increased need for ensuring and demonstrating tax compliance urges market players to 
align with multiple requirements, including robust documentation and transparency 
requirements, and alignment of functions across the value chain to address and mitigate tax, 
audit and reputational risk.156 Thus, more enterprises become inherently cautious, dedicate 
more time to risk management, raise concerns about compliance risk and their 
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reputation.157 Coordinated approach to tax risk management creates the need to consolidate 
activities in tax reporting, tax policy and governance, tax risk management in a narrower 
sense (development of control framework for existing risks, identifying new risks), tax 
assurance (assessment of effectiveness of controls, their operation and design).158  
The starting points for analysing PE tax risk management are defining tax governance and 
tax compliance. Tax governance means building and maintaining framework  identify, 
assess and manage tax risks to be confident that enterprise pays right amount of tax in the 
right state.159Tax governance covers the overall enterprise tax strategy, as well as internal 
policies addressing tax risks and external communications on tax-related matters.160 A 
good tax corporate governance model includes a robust risk management framework and 
procedures to identify, implement and report on the effectiveness of internal controls to 
mitigate tax risks.161 The internal control acts as the practical dimension of governance in a 
rapidly changing world.162  
Effectiveness of tax management is measured by level of tax compliance in MNE. Tax 
compliance is a degree to which taxpayers comply with the tax law.163 Tax compliance 
strategy of the company should be aligned with its strategy and corporate social 
responsibility values. For example, Electrolux states following: “One important aspect for 
Electrolux of being the best appliance company in the world is to act as a good corporate 
citizen and taxpayer wherever Electrolux operates.” This way this company highlights the 
high role of tax compliance in fulfilling corporate citizenship goals of the company. In 
practice, tax compliance is largely influenced by psychological and behavioural 
mechanisms, namely: 
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A. firm-specific factors such its industry, size, or financial status. 
B. individual attributes of tax function employees; 
C. perceived fairness of the taxation system in terms of tax rates and individual 
treatment by tax authorities.  
D. level of coordination in tax payments and acceptance of compliance as the social 
norm.164 
This means that tax risk management (TRM) framework of a MNE should aim to address 
specifics of the business model and markets its operates at, as well as employee's attitude 
to tax compliance and level of coordination and knowledge exchange in the enterprise. It is 
notable that Discussion Draft on Additional Guidance on Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments does not recommend any new ways of addressing significant 
compliance and administrative costs of creation of new PE under lowered PE threshold.165 
It means that such compliance principles will be in discretion of implementing countries to 
design and enforce. 166 For MNEs, it means increasing legal uncertainty and thus higher 
financial, legal and reputational risks of failure to comply. To ensure efficient tax 
governance system and high level of tax compliance, MNEs should carefully plan their (PE) 
tax risk management. 
3.3. Tax risk management: background 
External stakeholders are increasingly demanding increasing tax transparency on all levels, 
including how taxes are managed and paid. 167 Namely, tax functions are facing challenges 
in form of increasing costs of non-compliance, evolving complexity of tax legislation, 
growing demand for developing tax controls, and need to involve top management in tax 
risk management. 168 Tax authorities approach includes more frequent risks assessment and 
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Tax Audits: Approaches and Country Experiences (World Bank Publications, 2011) 14 
165 BEPS Alert (Deloitte Tax Publications, 23 June 2017) 
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audits, increased penalty threat, and a greater international cooperation and information 
between tax authorities.169  However, moral, ethics and social dimensions of tax are seldom 
subject to discussion. Thus, despite growing complexity of tax legislation with material 
impact on business activities, tax risk management is a little-studied area of corporate 
governance. 170 Changes in corporate attitude to tax governance are happening slowly, but 
some of them we can already observe. Whereas in past tax function focused on reducing 
costs and tax compliance, now it is becoming a more demanding corporate function that 
monitors the relationship between the company’s tax affairs and its corporate reputation.171 
As a result, already in 2014, companies had to spend approximately 10% more time on 
managing routine tax compliance and disputes/controversy.172 
Whereas tax governance is defined well in theoretical research, tax risk management 
(TRM) as a concept is primarily defined by consultancies that provide such services and 
thus create demand for TRM. Tax risk management is a part of corporate risk management 
which involves identifying risks, predicting their probability and seriousness of its impact, 
deciding what to do about them and taking action to implement these decisions.173 In 
practice, TRM is described as a framework of procedures, activities, assessments and 
controls to promote tax governance, address and reduce risks, as well as to equip 
organisation with way to forecast and prepare for tax legislation changes, ensure among all 
stakeholders that risks are maintained at acceptable level, and ensure that tax policies and 
process flows are standardised and integrated within the wider organisation. 174  TRM 
includes risk management conducted by tax administrations and by taxpayers. It helps tax 
authorities to identify indicators that certain taxpayers or business models pose an 
increased tax risk to jurisdiction and whether more activities on strengthening tax 
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compliance are required175 However, it is not easy to find definition of tax governance or 
TRM in materials of national tax authorities. Extensive definitions in English are provided 
only by Australian Taxation Office176, the European Commission177 and Chinese State 
Administration of Taxation.178 
There are different approaches to defining elements of TRM framework. One of them is to 
split TRM into areas based on content of activities and involved stakeholders into strategy, 
risk management and control environment, profile, relationships and communications, 
process & technology, staff, compliance, accounting, planning and coverage. 179  TRM 
inside the enterprise is enabled through tax controls framework (TCF).  The 2013 OECD 
Report highlights the role of internal control in assuring the accuracy and completeness of 
the tax returns and disclosures made by an enterprise.180 In practice, the scope of processes 
and obligations covered by TCF is wider, especially concerning PE risk management. TCF 
is a part of a control function of the enterprise, that helps the taxpayer to identify what tax 
issues to be disclosed and mitigate arising tax risks (risks of failure to show high level of 
tax governance and tax compliance). 181  TCF allows to assure  internal and external 
stakeholders, including tax authorities, that PE risk of MNE is well understood and 
appropriately controlled. 182  From accounting perspective, tax controls ensure timely 
reconciliation of tax accounts, proper recording of valuation allowances, guarantee fast 
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response to new reporting requirements and financial closing procedures, improve 
valuation and measurement of uncertain tax positions. 183 
Analysis of compound elements of TRM and TCF shows that achieving tax compliance, 
especially cross-borders, requires systematising multidisciplinary knowledge in 
international tax law and accounting. This knowledge is based on solid understanding of 
task division inside the company and expectations of tax authorities. Complexity of 
ensuring TCF shows that TRM planning and implementation should be split up in smaller 
areas, based on the substantial coverage. Managing PE risk is one of such areas. 
3.4. PE risk management as a part of tax risk management framework 
Difficulties in defining and rethinking PE threshold and further evolution of BEPS project 
have an important impact on MNEs. Lack of clarity in interpretations of the same concepts 
create a space for conflict between tax administrations and MNEs, on the one hand, and tax 
administrations themselves, on the other.184 Tax advisors were especially concerned about 
the hastily considered and implemented changes and the additional problems they might 
create.185 
In first chapter, I have covered following factors that show increasing need for PE risk 
management, namely: 
• Ongoing changes to PE concept under OECD Model Tax Convention brought by 
BEPS Action 7 and updated Commentaries to OECD Model Tax Convention; 
• Regulatory challenges presented by digital economy at the supranational level; 
• Specifics of approach of national tax authorities to interpreting PE concept; 
• Scrutiny of tax authorities when it comes to willingness of MNEs to trigger activity 
exceptions as stated in article 5(4) of the OECD Model, which are referred to as 
“preparatory and auxiliary activities”.186 
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Proactive management of PE risk will reduce the risk on unexpected tax payments, 
including penalties and interest charges, identify opportunities for improvements to tax 
internal control framework and strengthen the ability to make timely disclosure to tax 
authorities proving that reasonable care has been taken to manage PE issues.187 It will also 
help to assess risks of liability for taxes and charges relating to prior years, differing VAT 
obligations, and, obviously, double taxation of PE profits.188  The cost of failure to perform 
PE risk assessment is far beyond the tax liability in the narrow sense. It can result in 
reputational damage, corporate liability up to criminal proceedings and piercing corporate 
veil, additional employer reporting obligations covering payroll and social security, 
immigration considerations for employees, and industry-specific regulatory issues.189 
To map the scope and needed effort for managing PE risk, it is important to systematise the 
questions that MNE should ask first. Analysis in chapter 1 has helped to identify following 
questions: 
Table 2. Guiding questions for PE risk management190 
What should go right? • Determination of taxable presence in the country 
where the enterprise is not a tax residence 
• Determination of income attributable to PE 
How can it go wrong? • Failure to identify PE 
• Failure to comply with reporting obligations 
What are causes and 
consequences? 
Analysed at risk identification and risk analysis stages 
How likely is it to occur? Analysed at risk ranking and prioritisation stage 
What can be done to detect, 
control and manage 
identified risks? 
Analysed at risk treatment stage 
What are the alternatives? To be addressed throughout risk management stages 
These questions allow to ensure ongoing re-evaluation and updates in risk management 
processes. 191  However, to be able to provide up-to-date answers to these questions, 
receiving static knowledge at the start of TRM planning is not enough – knowledge should 
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be constantly updated. For this reason, to manage PE risk, it is vital to identify the stage of 
tax risk management and analyse PE concept under each of the stages. There is 
surprisingly little research on actual stages of tax risk assessment in framework of TRM. 
As a basis for my analysis, I have taken the approach present in OECD Compliance Risk 
Management Guidance Note 192  and Risk management guide for tax administrators 
published by the European Commission.193 It identifies following stages that are based on 
ISO 31000 Risk Management standard,194 generic risk management framework and are 
identical to classification followed by tax administrations outside the EU195:   
1. Risk identification (identifying hazards and failures, adverse consequences)  
2. Risk analysis (describing and quantifying risk, estimating probabilities) 
3. Risk ranking, prioritisation and assessment (estimating significance of the risk and 
conducting cost/benefit analysis) 
4. Risk treatment. 
4.1.Design, implement and test controls 
4.2.Monitoring, assurance and escalation.196197 
I will use this TRM stage breakdown for a couple of reasons. First, using it allows to better 
understand approach of tax authorities to tax risk management and thus equips MNEs with 
an effective approach to analysis taxation regimes. Second, it has a detailed and practically 
oriented breakdown of risk management stages that allows to prioritise goals and strategies 
in the situation when resources of the enterprise are inevitably restricted. Third, this 
approach is based on the long-established approach to corporate risk management, which, 
is in its turn, based on experience from different industries and projects. Namely, back in 
1995 researchers split corporate risk management into following stages: identification of 
risk or uncertainties, analysis of implications, response to minimise risk, allocation of 
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appropriate contingencies.198  Chapman and Ward identified following stages: defining, 
focusing, identifying, structuring, taking ownership, estimation, evaluating and planning.199 
Thus, methodology I am using for TRM planning is based on both general project 
management theory and practical approach of OECD and tax authorities of different states 
and legal systems. In following sections of the chapter, I will look how to address PE tax 
risk of each of the stages for different elements of a value chain of MNE. 
3.5. Risk identification 
Risk identification is the first stage of TRM, during which potential risks that threaten the 
objectives of the organisation are recorded.  If risks are not identified already at the first 
stage, there is a high chance that they will never be covered later.200 Thus, it is important to 
focus on what elements of operating models and general functioning of enterprise can 
trigger PE risk.  
The enterprise should consider tax risks in following areas: 
1. Corporate structure – international tax presence arising from the 
organisational chart of enterprise: 
2. Operational – planning and strategy; 
3. Legislation; 
4. Deals — major transactions, e.g. due to restructuring of enterprise;  
5. Operations – day-to-day processes, value chain and management 
decisions.201 
This breakdown makes it clear that PE risk may arise in any sector of business activity. 
Moreover, ongoing changes brought by BEPS Actions create the risk that tax authorities 
may re-evaluate even routine and long-established activities of MNE, such as its agency 
arrangements. In practice, this may impact MNE status in many ways. Namely, EY’s 2014 
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Tax Risk and Controversy Survey identified four main sources of risks — reputation, 
legislative, enforcement and operational. 202   “Compliance risk”, or “Legislative risk” 
means the risk of misapplication of the relevant tax laws due to fraud or error, whereas 
“Operational risk” is “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people, systems or external events”. 203  Enforcement risk is left out of scope based on 
research scope restrictions. 
3.6. Risk analysis 
The goal of risk analysis stage is to systematically weigh and group identified risks based 
on frequency (the number of risks), the gravity (the chance that the risk materializes) and 
consequence (in this case, amount of taxable profit of PE). 204  It allows to identify root 
causes of risks.205 Analysis of PE concept in chapter 1 and exploring risk identification 
stage have shown that PE risk may impact all spheres of business activities of MNE. In 
case of telecommunications sector MNE, it will mean coverage of both procure-to-pay 
(procurement side) and order-to-cash accounting cycles as shown below.  
Table 3. PE risk matrix in post-BEPS environment (Vreeswijk, Tan)206 
        
 Plan Design Buy  Make Store and move Market and sell Service 
High 
risk 
     Comissionaire 
(principal role in 
conclusion of 
contracts) 
 
   Procurement 
office (goods 
for resale) 
Toll 
manufactu
ring 207 
(access to 
inventory) 
Group logistics 
warehouse 
(access to 
inventory) 
Comissionaire 
(third-party or 
multiple 
comtracts) 
 
   Procurement 
office 
Toll 
manufactu
Group logistics 
warehouse 
Limited risk local 
distributor (flash 
Multiple 
contracts< 
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(indirect 
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208 
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To group the PE risks on a higher level, I will simplify the matrix of Vreeswijk and Tan, 
by splitting value chain into R&D activities, transportation (including warehousing), sales 
and consumer use, that may also cover after-sales services. The chart below also shows 
that PE risk management is likely to entail interaction with internal (employees) and 
external (suppliers, agents) stakeholders. 
 
Chart 4. Simplified value chain model for PE risk assessment 
Mapping PE risks in a detailed risk matrix and providing a high-level classification of 
business creates a solid basis for defining what risks MNE should address first at the stage 
of PE risk ranking, prioritisation and assessment.  
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3.7. PE risk ranking, prioritisation and assessment: three key PE risks in a value 
chain 
Main aim of this stage to choose which risks are to be treated under available treatment 
forms and resources (including time and competence).  To perform this stage, one need to 
gather and process information about risks and about available resources.214 
Table 4. PE risk prioritisation 
R&D Transportation Sales Consumer use 
 • Warehouses215 
 
• Dependent 
agent risk 
 
General (at all value chain stages): Employee mobility and functions 
• Home office 
• Secondment 
• Acting as dependent agent 
I would like to prioritise chosen risks (PE risks arising from employee mobility, warehouse 
PE risk, and dependent agent PE risk at distribution stage) for following reasons. First, 
these risks are almost inevitable regardless of specifics of industry. Second, regardless 
these risks PE concept has recently experienced changes. Third, these risks are largely 
framed during interaction with internal and external stakeholders, whose actions are 
difficult to control both due to reporting specifics (e.g. agent´s obligations under applicable 
laws) and geographical distance (e.g. employees on the other continent). Fourth, analysing 
their complexity provides an illustrative basis to identify PE risks stemming from other 
stages or elements of operating model. 
Once I have prioritised the risks, I would like to focus on its initial assessment. Dependent 
agent risk is further addressed in chapter 3. For this reason, I provide only a high-level 
assessment of dependent agent PE risk in this section.  
3.7.1. Employee mobility 
Virtualisation (a trend when MNEs gradually replace physical centralisation with a more 
virtual model) scatters people around the globe and potentially creates a taxable nexus.216  
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Operational model of MNE creates the need for strengthening employee mobility, 
flexibility and competence. It results in growing popularity of such arrangements as remote 
work from home office and secondment (temporary transfer of an official or worker to 
another position or employment). In addition to that, employees can also act as agents of 
an enterprise, triggering dependent agent PE risk that will be discussed separately in more 
detail. OECD Model mentions an interesting example of a “painter, who, for two years, 
spends three days a week in the large office building of its main client”, thus creating 
painter's own PE at that office building. 217   This example shows that the analysis of 
relatively most important functions of the painter’s business is the decisive criterion for 
identifying whether PE exists. Also, employee mobility together with broadening of their 
function can trigger PE in cases when employees working in the source state “take an 
active part in the negotiation of important part of contracts for the sale of goods to buyers” 
in the source state, as these activities would amount to essential part of the business, not 
just auxiliary activities.218 Regarding home office of employee, OECD Model states that 
performing work from the home office of an individual should not automatically mean that 
location is at the disposal of the enterprise, as working remotely from home is likely to be 
only incidental. 219  When an employee performs services, such as consulting, for the 
foreign company, it can result in PE in light of lowered PE threshold. 220  In contract, 
supervisory activities at the PE are unlikely to trigger PE, except for cases of exceptionally 
long duration of such activities. 221   
When assessing PE risks rising from employee mobility, MNE should answer following 
questions: 
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• When employees head for an assignment to another country, will they work at a 
fixed location there (amounting to “fixed place of business”, one of key elements of 
PE)? 
• Are employees going to use facility “at the disposal of” enterprise? 
• Are activities performed by employees long-term and habitual? What are main 
characteristics of work performed at the home office in relation to the job function 
of the employee and the business model of the employer?222 For example, under 
Finnish Tax Administration guidelines, rendering PE in home office requires that 
the employee has allocated a space to work from home “on a permanent basis 
rather than for non-recurrent or random performance of work activities, or carrying 
out auxiliary or preparatory activities”. 223   
• Are there cases of seconding employees or temporarily assigning them for a work 
in a source State?224 
• What is the type of influence the employer has on managing the home office as 
business premises? 225 
In light of this, it is essential to include monitoring the presence of employees in particular 
countries and extent of their activities when planning tax controls addressing PE risk. 226  
Full understanding of their functional profile and reporting hierarchy of employees is a 
crucial element in ensuring tax compliance not only for wage tax, but also for corporate 
taxes. 227 Virtualisation also increases the role of HR departments in monitoring where 
people are deployed and in what roles, which is a challenging function.228 All in all, both 
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employee and employer functions should be considered altogether to identify whether an 
employee triggers PE presence.229  
Analysis has shown that employee mobility can create a significant level of PE risk for 
several reasons. First, there is no high-level analysis of features that would trigger PE in 
case of employment relationship – analysis is provided on case-by-case basis, primarily in 
case law. Second, this analysis operates qualitative criteria of nature of work (scope of 
tasks and temporality) and of employer control. These criteria are difficult to identify, as 
HR function may not have visibility to the scope of tasks that employee actually performs. 
This increases risk of information asymmetry, when one party is better informed than the 
other. 
3.7.2. Warehousing 
Warehouse management is a significant element of business in consumer electronics and 
becomes even more complex due to globalisation and emergence of multiple dispatcher 
centres with sophisticated logistics network.230 Analysis of PE risk in case of warehousing 
is of growing importance due to OECD tendency to apply economic/substance test. For 
example, regional warehouses and delivery centres play a vital role in establishment of 
online stores and digital marketing operations without creating any other physical fixed 
place of business in a source state.231  
To capture sales of goods sold online and then delivered from the warehouse, in the post-
BEPS era, a warehouse triggers PE status if its activities constitute core business activities 
of the enterprise. 232  Namely, as a general rule, when warehouse of an enterprise is 
maintained by third party, it should not constitute a PE for an enterprise as it can fall under 
one of the exceptions under Article 5(4) of the OECD Model.233 However, if an enterprise 
has an unlimited access to warehouse to inspect goods, the character of these activities 
should be assessed to see whether warehouse actually falls under exception of preparatory 
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or auxiliary activity.234 However, a need to quickly deliver goods to the clients will be a 
key element of the e-commerce model, and thus it is unlikely that maintaining a local 
warehouse will fall under auxiliary activity exception.235 Moreover, if maintaining such a 
warehouse requires a number of employees mainly to store and deliver goods sold online, 
auxiliary activity exception will not apply.236 237 Also, Article 13 of MLI highlights that tax 
authority should assess whether overall activity of a deemed PE, not separate activities 
have a preparatory or auxiliary character. 238  Additionally, an anti-fragmentation rule 
prevents enterprises from escaping PE scope by spreading multiple entities of the supply 
chain across numerous jurisdictions.239 
Analysis shows that managing PE risk in warehouse operations is likely to be closely 
connected with managing employee mobility risks, as employees of MNE are likely to be 
responsible for goods inspection, storage and delivery. In case when warehouse is managed 
by a third party, risk is multiplied. 
3.7.3. Dependent agent model 
Sales agency, commissionaire agreements, limited risk distributorship and sales branches 
are essential transaction models for distribution, including consumer electronics sector. 240 
Some of these models increase the risk that agent representing interests in concluding 
contracts in a foreign country will fall under the scope of Article 5(5) of OECD Model 
based on economic reality of the transaction.241  In light of BEPS Actions, we can already 
see a trend of businesses modifying their distribution models to get rid of elements of 
commissionaire structures that can fell under dependent agent PE scope. 242 
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In contrast to employee mobility and warehousing risks, that require more general 
economic substance analysis, dependent agent PE risk analysis deserves more detailed 
approach based on applicable law. The reasons for it is the complex textual provisions on 
dependent agent PE conditions that can have conflicting interpretations in civil and 
common law systems, as well as difficulties to predict how BEPS Action 7 will impact 
practical implementation of PE concept. For this reason, I will address the dependent agent 
PE risk further in chapter 3 where I will present the practical application of risk 
management stages under Article 5(5) of OECD Model Tax Convention.  
3.8. Risk treatment through tax controls framework for PE 
Risk treatment aims to reduce the chances that risk events will occur and consequences if 
such risks occur.243 Risk treatment means modifying a system or its elements to affect 
particular risk events, which is a follow-up action after risks are identified and 
described.244 Design of risk treatment strategies should take into account such factors as 
tax risk category, potential impact, likelihood, urgency (factors already addressed at risk 
prioritization stage), as well as specific factors such as mitigation strategy, its benefits, 
estimated costs to benefit and available resources.245 Thus, risk treatment strategies focus 
on detection and control at the stage of reducing chances of occur, and recovery plans to 
mitigate consequences once risk events took place.246 It involves both development of tax 
controls and it testing to ensure that they operate effectively. 
3.8.1. Design and implement controls 
To formulate approach to a taxpayer, tax authorities aim to understand the general tax 
governance framework of an enterprise and how key stakeholders identify their key 
responsibilities, risks present at the market and how enterprise board are informed about 
risks, as well as ways how enterprises identify significant and new transactions and explain 
significant accounting differences. 247 All in all, tax authorities should first get acquainted 
with and understand the business processes of the enterprise before assessing its tax 
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controls framework. 248  For these reasons, TCF should be clear both for internal and 
external stakeholders. 
TCF goals span well beyond the compliance with reporting purposes. Primarily, it should 
establish risk ownership by identifying who will have a main role in managing PE risk – 
CFO, tax function or someone else.249 TCF allows to manage tax risk with clarity and 
confidence through ensuring coordinated approach, gradual building of framework 
components, enabling consistency of PE risks controls with broader tax reporting and 
transparency requirements, as well as with sound risk management policies.250 Tax control 
framework enables planning in detail how to address PE risks in general tax control 
framework and specific tax controls, plan communications to multiple stakeholders (from 
sales to HR), and assess the need for specific operational controls based on business model 
of the company (to be discussed further also in chapter 3). Tax controls lifetime includes 
planning (defining objectives and scope of TCF), insight (determining material tax risks 
and status of tax risk management), design (designing and formulating tax procedures), 
implementation (embedding tax controls into processes and systems) and monitoring 
(testing its effectiveness).251 
Key stakeholders of tax control framework, in addition to directly identified risk owners, 
are board, CFO, Audit committee, Risk function (at strategy and governance level), Heads 
of Divisional Finance/Region CFOs, Group Tax, HR (building tax controls framework and 
driving processes), Internal audit (assurance). 252  External stakeholders interested in 
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effective and consistent reporting of taxes are not only tax authorities, but also  investors, 
customers, lenders, employees, tax authorities and society as a whole. 253 
OECD identifies following essential building blocks of TCF that are consistent with 
internal control models such as COSO: 
• Tax strategy is established, clearly documented, including assignment of ownership, 
applied comprehensively. For instance, for Electrolux, one of main goals of tax 
strategy is stated simply – “the right amount of taxes are paid in the right country” 
to ensure reputation of “as the best-in-class corporate citizen in every 
jurisdiction”.254  Its Group Tax Policy aims to  provide “guiding principles for 
employees involved in tax matters, their key responsibilities, systems and controls, 
and details on oversight of tax matters in general”.255 
• Responsibilities for the design, implementation and effectiveness of the tax control 
framework are clearly assigned. For instance, Electrolux has a Tax Board, that 
includes inter alia, the CFO of the Group and Head of Global Tax & Accounting 
and ensures that “material tax related matters are handled in a consistent way”).256 
• Governance (including rules and reporting procedures) is documented, ensuring 
that transactions and events comply with applicable regulations and internal 
guidelines. Electrolux, for instance, highlights the communication aspect of 
document exchange, stating that “information on changes needed and ongoing 
projects etc. are shared internally to keep all parts of the organization up to date”.257 
• Testing of compliance with policies of processes under TCF is under constant 
monitoring and maintenance.  
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• TCF provides assurance to internal and external (tax authorities) stakeholders that 
tax risks are controlled, and these controls provide reliable outputs.258 
For these reasons, a starting point of addressing PE risk is to ensure that PE risk is captured 
under general tax and reporting controls that enable correct reflection of transactions in 
accounting system and regulate intracompany transactions at a general level. 
Once the enterprise has the understanding that general tax controls framework allows to 
ensure tax compliance on more general level, enterprise may consider taking specific 
actions, that cover PE risk more specifically. 
3.8.2. Monitoring and testing.259 
An enterprise should be able to test how its tax strategy and specific control function in 
day-to-day operations to see whether they are effective and how they contribute to overall 
performance of the tax strategy.260 This includes testing both design (assessing adequacy of 
its structure and provisions) and operational effectiveness of control (assessing how it has 
actually helped to mitigate risk). 261 Thus, quite a big part of monitoring will happen on 
more general level of tax strategy. In other words, control effectiveness cannot be assessed 
just based on one separate criterion, as they are interrelated.262 However, there are couple 
of testing aspects that will be specific to PE risk management. 
MNEs can use such methods to test controls as inquiries with key stakeholders listed above, 
inspecting relevant documentation and performing business model and transaction analysis. 
263 The latter includes stages of understanding impact of PE provisions on transactions, 
                                                          
258 Co-Operative Tax Compliance. Building Better Tax Control Frameworks (OECD Publishing, 2016) 15 
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/co-operative-tax-compliance_9789264253384-en> accessed 21 
October 2018   
259 Nikhil Hira, “Managing Tax Risks: The Role of the Board: A top – down approach” (ICPAK Governance 
Conference, 12 April 2013) 6 <https://www.icpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ICPAK_Corp-
Gov__Risk-Mgt_10Apr13_Jona-Copy.pdf> accessed 21 October 2018 
260 Rudy Verstappen, Tjeerd van den Berg and Hifsa Younus, “Tax Transparency Benchmark 2017” (PwC, 
November 2017) 13 <https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-tax-transparency-benchmark-2017.pdf> 
accessed 21 October 2018  
261 Australian Government Australian Taxation Office, Tax risk management and governance review guide 
(18 April 2018) <https://www.ato.gov.au/business/large-business/in-detail/key-products-and-resources/tax-
risk-management-and-governance-review-guide/?page=5#TestingOperationalEffectivenessOfControl> 
accessed 21 October 2018  
262 Internal Control, A Practical Guide (KPMG, October 1999) 42 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/kpmg_internal_control_practical_guide.pdf> accessed 21 October 
2018  
263 Australian Government Australian Taxation Office, Tax risk management and governance review guide 
(18 April 2018) <https://www.ato.gov.au/business/large-business/in-detail/key-products-and-resources/tax-
risk-management-and-governance-review-guide/?page=5> accessed 21 October 2018   
 49 
 
identifying key stages of each model or transaction that are especially prone to PE risk and, 
last, identifying how controls could and actually have mitigated the risk over the applicable 
testing period. 264  To be more exact, testing may cover inspection of checklists and 
communication protocols.265 For example, Electrolux conducts both formal and informal 
procedures for independent testing purposes at least twice a year. Its results are verified by 
external audit when larger reporting units are in question, and improvements are 
suggested.266 
Analysis of goals of risk treatment has shown that both design of tax controls and its 
ongoing testing are inevitable stages of the process that happen in cycle. Constant 
monitoring is especially important in light of dynamic changes to PE taxation regime due 
to BEPS Action. Periodic monitoring activities allow to build an effective system to 
communicate to a wide number of stakeholders how MNE identifies risks, treats them and 
makes risk treatment system even better.  
3.9. Conclusions 
Risk management involves identifying risks, assessing their probability and level of their 
impact, deciding what to do about them and implementing follow-up actions.267 Industry 
trends, such as growing employee mobility and increasing complexity of logistics and 
distribution chains multiplies the risk that established business routines or innovative 
business models will fall under PE scope. Due to trend of lowering PE threshold, PE status 
may come as a surprise to stakeholders. To minimize uncertainty, MNE should build a 
systematised approach to PE risk management. 
This chapter has covered how addressing and mitigating PE risk should be a systematized 
and well-documented activity and a part of a more high-level effort of the enterprise to 
ensure tax compliance through developing tax strategy and tax governance framework. 
Having common vision on tax compliance and wider scope of possible tax risks that is 
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communicated to key stakeholders is the only way to ensure that the enterprise will ensure 
compliance with complex and changing PE taxation regulations all over the world. 
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4. MANAGING DEPENDENT AGENT PE RISK 
4.1.  Introduction 
It would be too easy to circumvent PE taxation if there was no specific PE fiction 
addressing cases of foreign agency, when a person performs legal acts on behalf of another 
person abroad. 268  Dependent agent PE is created when an enterprise (a resident of a 
contracting state) is represented by an agent (as defined by Article 5(5) of OECD Model) 
in the host country and becomes taxable in that host country.269 Dependent agent may act 
in different ways – for example, employees based in the host state with the authority to 
conclude contracts on behalf of the enterprise, associated enterprises with the power to 
conclude contracts, and unassociated third parties whose economic relations with the 
enterprise give these third parties a status of dependent agent.270 PE may also exist when 
the sales representative's authority handles the customers' warranty and statutory warranty 
claims.271 
In this chapter, I will look into the permanent establishment risk management in case of 
distribution models of MNEs. First, I will explore background of dependent agent PE 
concept. This will allow to identify primary goals of this concept and trends of its 
development in international taxation regulation. Next, I will analyse the current OECD 
Model Tax Convention provisions on dependent agent PE. This will help to identify the 
risk elements that construct the definition of PE. Its detailed analysis will enable to 
prioritise, assess and analyse risks, as well as to come up with risk treatment strategy. 
4.2. Background of dependent agent PE concept 
In case of a single enterprise, firm boundaries are defined by the fixed place of business 
where enterprise operates (substantial physical presence criterium). 272 In case of agency, 
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the boundary is extended beyond a single legal entity to cover activities of agent as another 
entity. 273  
Exploring the history of dependent agent PE concept will allow us to understand its 
rationale in more detail. Agent PE concept originated in the 19th century, when by an agent 
one could consider a travelling salesman or a local representative of a foreign manufacturer, 
entrusted to conclude orders from firm customers in the host state. 274 Originally, agent PE 
provision was introduced to avoid “manipulations” by the taxpayers and at the same time 
to ensure fiscal neutrality to economically similar situations (e.g. market penetration in the 
source state). 275  At the 1920 Brussels Financial Conference, double taxation was 
recognised as the “major obstacle to the reconstruction of the public finance of the world”. 
276 In 1927 and 1928 the League of Nations formulated the original model treaties that still 
left two questions open – where and when did dependent agent constitute PE, and how to 
calculate PE profits.277 As a summary of the developments before OECD Draft (1963), the 
“bona fide agent of independent status (broker, commission agent, etc.)” did not amount to 
a PE. Real legal and economic independence was required for an agent not to fall under PE 
scope.278 
Agent PE concept has been defined in Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention since 
first 1963 edition, without significant changes over numerous editions.279  Dependent agent 
PE concept development reflects the trend of replacing facility-oriented approach to PE 
with an activity-oriented approach that focuses on deemed PEs constituted by human 
activities.280 This way, OECD 1963 model and its Commentary views dependent agents as 
a separate type of PE as it does not by any means refer to “place of business” of the 
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agent.281 It means that already at that time the agent did not have to use a place of business 
to constitute the agency PE.282 It shows that dependent agency PE emerged as a separate 
type of PE a long time ago. 
As already discussed in chapter 2, globalisation inevitably makes business models and 
value chains more complex and strengthen the will of tax authorities to counter tax 
avoidance schemes. OECD has frequently discussed the division of supply chains of 
MNEs. 283 It has been clear since long the start of the BEPS project that the OECD aspired 
to change the dependent agent rule terms due to concerns about commissionaire and 
similar arrangements.284 A commissionaire agreement is an arrangement where a person 
sells products in a given country in its own name, but on behalf of a foreign entity owning 
these products (see Chart 6). 285  These arrangements fell out the scope of the rule in 
previous editions.286 Commissionaire arrangements allowed taxpayers to shift risks, assets 
and profits of local distributors to low-tax jurisdictions where the principal was located. 287 
Changes brought by BEPS Action 7 to OECD Model Tax Convention lowered PE 
threshold in a way that can trigger PE in case of commissionaire agreements. 
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Chart 5. Commissionaire agreement288 
BEPS Action 7 also explored similar tax avoidance strategies, such as contracts which are 
substantially negotiated in one state but finalised or authorised abroad, as well as cases 
where the person habitually exercising an authority to conclude contracts constitutes an 
“independent agent”.289 
All in all, tightening regulation of agent PEs to tackle commissionaire agreement resulted 
in lowering the PE threshold (Article 5(5) of OECD Model Tax Convention) and 
narrowing down criteria for agent independence (Article 5(6) of OECD Model Tax 
Convention.290 
4.3. Current provisions on dependent agent PE under Article 5(5) of OECD Model 
Tax Convention 
Definition of an agency PE in the OECD Model Tax Convention is one of the longest in 
tax treaties ever.291  The relatively narrow scope of definition stated in Article 5(5) of 
OECD Model has prompted tax planning. Namely, enterprises started to replace traditional 
distributor arrangements by “commissionaire arrangements” which resulted in shifting 
profits out of the country where the sales take place without changing the functions in that 
country substantively, as well as efforts to artificially fragment operations among several 
entities to fall under exception for preparatory and ancillary activities.292 As a result, BEPS 
Action 7 required a policy re-evaluation of existing PE concept in relation to 
commissionaire arrangements. The BEPS initiative’s Focus Group on the Artificial 
Avoidance of PE Status is strongly convinced that legal structures should follow the “real 
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world” facts, one of its goals is to aggressively combat tax structures where legal reality 
does not match facts.293 
Report on Action 7 (Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment 
Status) resulted in changes to Article 5(5) of OECD Model Tax Convention. Updated 
provision states that 
“Where a person is acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an enterprise and, in 
doing so, habitually concludes contracts or habitually plays the principal role 
leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely concluded without 
material modification by the enterprise... The enterprise shall be deemed to have 
a permanent establishment in that state” 
 
In other words, dependent agent PE is created when an enterprise residing in a contracting 
state becomes taxable in another host country on its business profit, if this enterprise is 
represented by an agent in the host country, who has and habitually exercises an authority 
to conclude the contract.294 Objective of revised Article 5(5) is to cover situations when a 
contract is substantially negotiated in one country, but approved or finalised outside this 
country.295 Before this revision of Article 5(5), actual conclusion of contracts was required 
to trigger PE – now the scope is wider. 
There is a reason why the first chapter was fully dedicated to analysis of general PE 
concept. The general definition under Article 5 “sets a standard for the entire convention”, 
so it will be relevant also for all other provisions of OECD Model Tax Convention 
referring to the general concept.296 However, to map risks specific to dependent agent PE, 
it is important to identify key risk elements present in definition of dependent agent PE. In 
this context, by risk elements, I mean key characteristics of dependent agent based on 
wording of Article 5(5), that allow to assess the present of dependent agent PE on the case-
by-case basis. 
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4.4. PE risk identification: key risk elements of OECD Model Tax provisions 
In this part, I would go through the compound elements of dependent agent PE definition 
(see Chart 6), that in its turn will allow to assess, prioritise and analyse risks arising from 
distributor activities. 
 
Chart 6. Key compounds (risk elements) of dependent agent PE concept under Article 5(5) of 
OECD Model Tax Convention 
4.4.1. “Person” 
The term “person” is defined in Art. 3 para. 1 letter a) OECD Model and includes 
individuals, companies and any other bodies of persons, such as partnerships, foundations 
and other legal forms as long as they are either corporate bodies for tax purposes (i.e. 
companies) or constitute other bodies of persons. 297 Persons who can create an agency PE 
do not need to reside in the State in which they act or to maintain a place of business in that 
State. 298299 It is also irrelevant whether the person has limited or unlimited tax liability in 
that State, or is found to be an agent under the applicable domestic law.300301 In other 
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words, in case of dependent agent PE, “personal connection test” replaces “location 
test”.302 
4.4.2. “Acting” 
Article 5(5) does not specify whether the activity is restricted to certain types of business 
activities, meaning that potentially Article 5(5) will cover any business activity. Exception 
would be a mere passive representation in a state.303 Most likely, activities that fall under 
the scope of Article 5(5) are activities, which due to “scope of their authority” and the 
“nature of their activity”, involve the enterprise in sales-related business activities in the 
state concerned.304 
4.4.3. “On behalf of an enterprise” 
Person is not acting on behalf of the other enterprises, when person concludes contracts on 
its own behalf and to perform obligations arising from these contracts, e.g. in cases of low-
risk distribution.305 Thus, in case of low-risk distribution there are no concerns of PE risk, 
but BEPS addresses it from the perspective of the transfer pricing of risks and capital.306 
Namely, there can be a case of aggressive tax planning when title to the goods is 
transferred from the principal to the agent (“flash title”).307  
 However, linguistic peculiarities and specifics of legal systems may impact interpretation 
of this criterion. “Pour le compte” used in the official French version of the OECD Model 
can be translated as “on behalf of” but also “for the account of”. This indicates that the 
concept of “on behalf” can have both legal and economic perspectives.308 We will analyse 
it further when looking into the concept of contracts “in the name of enterprise”, as these 
notions are interconnected. 
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4.4.4. Habitual conclusion or principal role leading to the conclusion of 
contracts 
Habitually. Already before the BEPS, tax authorities were increasingly asserting that PE 
exists in case of a local commissionaire habitually entering into contracts binding on the 
foreign Principal, even if those contracts were not in the name of that Principal. 309 
However, this trend does not mean that habitualness criterion is predictable. Even though 
habitual exercise of authority is the key factor in identifying agency PE, there is no 
standard definition of “habitually”. 310 Thorough case-by-case analysis should consider the 
usual lifecycles of the contracts concluded and their relation to overall business model and 
activities.311 Habitual exercise of authority to conclude contracts can be determined based 
on following criteria: 
 (1) actual exercise of authority; 
 (2) frequency; and 
 (3) a certain degree of permanence (exceeding transitory presence).312 
Broad and ambiguous language increases a risk of accidental identification of PE, e.g. in 
case when a commission agent, a top-notch salesperson is acting more actively than 
expected, and this results in conclusion of contract.313 It makes habitualness criterion one 
of the riskiest among those I analysed so far. 
Conclusion of contracts. Signing of the contract is not the principal criterium of 
concluding the contract. It is well established that signing by “another person” who is 
different from the agent does not affect determination of agency PE is the signing does not 
                                                          
309 Lifting the mist: Sustainable distribution models in the post-BEPS world (EYGM Limited, 2017) 3 
<https://webforms.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-sustainable-distribution-models-in-the-post-beps-
world/$FILE/EY-sustainable-distribution-models-in-the-post-beps-world.pdf> accessed 21 October 2018 
310 Pasquale Pistone and César Alejandro Ruiz Jiménez, “Habitual Exercise of Authority to 
ConcludeContracts under Article 5 (5) of the OECDModel Convention” in ichael Lang (ed) Dependent 
Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 157 
311 David Feuerstein, “The Agency Permanent Establishment” in Florian Brugger and Patrick Plansky (eds), 
Permanent Establishments in International and EU Tax Law (Linde Verlag, 2011) 116 
312 Pasquale Pistone and César Alejandro Ruiz Jiménez, “Habitual Exercise of Authority to 
ConcludeContracts under Article 5 (5) of the OECDModel Convention” in ichael Lang (ed) Dependent 
Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde Verlag, 2014) 137 
313 David Forst and William Skinner, “Tax Alert: Commissionnaires and Other PE Structures under Scrutiny 
as Part of BEPS” (Fenwick & West LLP, 8 December 2014) 
<https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/tax-alert-commissionnaires-and-other-pe-structures-under-
scrutiny-as-part-of-beps.aspx> accessed 23 October 2018  
 59 
 
have any material influence on the obligations under previously negotiated contracts.314 
Sometimes there is no active negotiation of contractual terms before conclusion of contract, 
for example, in case of acceptance of the offer to enter into a standard contract, even if the 
actual signing happened outside the state.315 Also, negotiation of all element of details of a 
contract in a way binding the enterprise amounts to the conclusion of the contract, even if 
signing took place in another state.316 
Principal role leading to the conclusion of contracts that are routinely concluded 
without material modification by the enterprise. Previously, OECD Model Tax 
Convention covered only conclusion of the contracts. However, historically, some OECD 
member countries focused on “literally” signing contracts in the name of the principal 
whereas other interpreted it in a more broader way as requiring a legally or even 
economically binding authority.317 
Adding this new criterium widens the PE threshold by moving the focus from the formal 
authority to conclude contracts to the actual substance of activities of the agent.  BEPS 
Action 7 incentivised amendment of dependent agent PE to combat against the artificial 
use of commissionaire structures and offshore rubber-stamping arrangements. For example, 
in some tax avoidance arrangements, an automated system managed overseas by the parent 
company could be responsible for the finalisation of these contracts.318 Amendments to 
OECD have ensured that such tax avoidance schemes will trigger PE status. 
Goal of this criterion is to cover cases when the conclusion of contract directly results from 
the actions performed in a Contracting state, even if applicable law does not deem the 
contract concluded exactly in the State. 319 This is common for the sales force models when 
person solicits and receives orders sent directly to a warehouse after routine approval by 
the enterprise. 320  For example, if such approvals or reviews happen outside the State 
without modifying key aspects of the contract, the criterion of “principal role” of the agent 
                                                          
314 Arvid Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law International, 
1991) 489 
315 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and On Capital 242 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 87)  
316 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and On Capital 242 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 87) 
317 Alfred Storck and Sabine Schmidjell-Dommes, “Acting on Behalf of an Enterprise under Article 5(5) of 
the OECD Model Convention” in Michael Lang (ed) Dependent Agents as Permanent Establishments (Linde 
Verlag, 2014) 57 
318 OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 2018) 94 
<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264293083-en> accessed 20 October 2018 
319 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and On Capital 242 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 88) 
320 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and On Capital 243 (Commentary to Article 5, Para 88) 
 60 
 
is satisfied.321 This addition to Article 5 wording literally places any sales agent under the 
scope of dependent PE concept. For instance, it may penalise a sale agent who is good at 
job and thus is doing a great hob in negotiating contracts that would not require any 
changes by the enterprise.322 It is possible to get into a safe zone where local personnel 
may be involved in significant solicitation and even negotiations in the source state,  
In light of the complexity with which agency activities are defined, MNEs should carefully 
analyse examples provided in OECD Model to decide whether to restructure their sales 
organization.323 Commentary separates two examples. "Merely" promoting and marketing 
goods would not trigger PE status. There, OECD provides an example of active promotion 
of drugs by pharmaceutical representatives that does not directly result in doctors 
concluding the agreements with the enterprise.   However, immediately OECD provides 
two other examples. Namely, under its text, there is PE when the agent solicits and 
receives orders sent directly to "warehouse from which goods belonging to the enterprise 
are delivered" warehouse without their formal finalisation (formal finalisation is carried 
through routinous approvals by the enterprise). Also, employees of the enterprise actively 
explaining standard terms of the contract that lead to subsequent conclusion of the contract 
online fall under scope of agency that triggers PE. 324  These examples shows the 
determination of OECD to look into substance of business arrangements and cover tax 
avoidance arrangements that MNEs could get away with under previous PE threshold. 
Also, these cases allow to understand what “without material modification” means in 
practice, namely, cases of routinous approvals of signing. However, explaining the 
concepts of “principal role” through examples creates the field for uncertainty. 
4.4.5 Contracts 
It is vitally important to explore what exactly contracts fall under the scope of dependent 
agent PE. To do it, I should start with key characteristics breakdown. Under Article 5(5) of 
OECD Model Tax Convention, following types of contracts concluded or actively 
negotiated by agent can trigger determination of PE:  
• “in the name of enterprise” 
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• “for the transfer of ownership”, or “for the granting of the right to use property 
owned by that enterprise or that the enterprise has the right to use” 
• “for the provision of services of that enterprise”. 
First, I would like to start with the classic approach to the scope of dependent agent PE, 
covering contracts concluded “in the name of enterprise”. Contracts include not only 
contracts for the sale of goods, but also other types of contracts, such as leasing 
contracts.325 Term “in the name of” comes from the technical vocabulary of civil law 
where it determines “whether foreign enterprise or the intermediary is bounded by the 
contract concluded with the third party”. 326  This term has no meaning in common law. It 
shows the danger of assuming that one legal system has a universal application. 327 
According to some reports, PE can be rendered even when the contract is neither “in the 
name of” the principal nor legally “binding” on the principal, but rather agent involves the 
foreign enterprise “to a large extent in the local economy”. 328  Whether a contract 
concluded by the intermediary legally binds the enterprise is defined by the domestic 
commercial laws which govern the agency contract.329 
Terms “on behalf of” and “in the name of” have a certain level of linguistic vagueness. 
Most likely, at the moment of drafting, they meant “binding”.330 In law and practice, there 
are two approaches to defining what “binding” means, as shown below. 
Table 5. Economic and legalistic approaches to interpretation of “in the name of”331 
Approach Economic approach Legalistic approach 
Main concept Legal binging force of 
contract is not decisive, 
active participation in 
negotiating contract and 
securing legal 
“In the name of” requires 
contracts that legally binds 
the principal towards the 
third party 
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arrangements can amount 
to required “economic 
link” in the source state 
Agency scope Agency relationship, both 
direct and indirect, binds 
the principal towards the 
third party 
Not every dependent agent 
will lead to an agency PE 
– one should distinguish 
between direct and 
indirect representation 
Case law Phillippe Morris case Zimmer, Dell, Boston 
Scientific cases 
The tax authorities favouring economic approach to “authority to conclude contracts in the 
name of the enterprise” all lost in their cases before the respective supreme courts.332 It is 
predictable, as they aim to increase their tax revenue. As noted already during discussion 
on Article 5 back in 2013, national courts lack a common stance on whether possession of 
"authority" implies a valid legal relationship with a third party or whether an economic 
commitment of a principal by its agent will suffice.333 Namely, in cases Zimmer, Dell, 
Boston Scientific, respective supreme courts ruled that a commissionaire acting in his own 
name and under the applicable law of a state that does not legally bind the principal, does 
not constitute a PE.334 It means that “binding” is to be interpreted in legal sense only, but 
not from economic/commercial perspective.335 In view of the historical analysis of the 
agency clause and its connection with the independent agent provision contained in article 
5(6), it seems reasonable to understand agency as “concluding contracts legally binding the 
enterprise in relations with the third party”.336 However, some still argue that “in the name 
of” is too narrow criterion to cover MNE fragmented distribution chains and it should be 
widened to ensure that commercial dependence between the agent and its principal is 
captured.337 However, I believe that such proposals would bring even more uncertainty. 
Already now, taxpayers are under risk to find that the same agreement can give rise to a 
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very different tax treatment in different countries due to conflict of laws.338 Thus, it is 
likely that in practice tax authorities would focus more on exploring whether agency 
relationship satisfies the criterion of concluding contracts or playing principal role in it.  
In addition to agreements on provision of services, agents may also conclude the 
agreements triggering the transfer of ownership or the right to use property. This 
definition covers commissionaire agreements since the goal of the contract is to transfer 
the ownership of the property owned by a foreign enterprise even if that foreign enterprise 
is not a party to that contract.339  It does not matter whether property in question existed or 
was owned by the enterprise when the contract between the commissionaire and the third 
parties was concluded, as contracts may cover delivery of the tangible or intangible goods 
that will be produced later.340 
Analysis of “contract” term has shown that it may be a significant source of uncertainty for 
MNEs functioning cross-borders due to specifics of legal systems and differing approaches 
of tax authorities and courts in interpreting binding force. Namely, BIAC (Business at 
OECD) have noticed that lack of consensus on interpretation of contracts due to OECD not 
preferring expressed view on this point allows dissenting members to record their 
disagreements through observations.341 Concept of agency that I will explore next also has 
the similar uncertainty effect. 
4.4.6. Independent agent in the ordinary course of business 
Agent. Under Article 5(6) of OECD Model, Article 5 (5) shall not apply 
 “where the person acting in a Contracting state on behalf of an enterprise of the 
other Contracting State carries on business in the first-mentioned State as 
independent agent and acts for the enterprise in the ordinary course of 
business”342. 
For this reason, it is important to define what OECD Model Tax Convention means by 
“agent” and what agent would be considered “independent”.  Article 5(6) OECD Model 
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Tax Convention 2010 had a more detailed listing of types of agents rather than simply 
stating referring to ordinary course of business: 
“An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a 
Contracting State merely because it carries on business in that State through a 
broker, general commission agent or any other agent of an independent status, 
provided that such persons are acting in the ordinary course of their business”.343  
The more general reference to “agent” makes implementation of Article 5(6) more flexible, 
especially in reality of really different legal systems. Concept should focus on the manner 
in which the agent conducts his business activities in a broader sense. 344  Domestic laws 
play an important role in shedding some light what agent is and what is his business 
functions.345 Namely, domestic law of a few countries, in particular Germany and the UK, 
influenced the terminology chosen in the OECD model.346 Working Group on Article 5 has 
for a long time pointed out that "general commission agent" used in the English version of 
OECD Model does not correspond with term "commissionaire" that appears in French 
version.347 
To be more specific, there is a difference between civil law and common law approaches to 
agency concept. Namely, the UK law defines following types of representation: 
• “Direct where they act in the name of and on behalf of another person 
• Indirect where they act in their own name but on behalf of another person 
• Self -representation when a person acts on their own behalf.”348 
 
A person who is not “truly represent” of the principal in this manner – like the indirect 
representative under civil law – is not regarded as an “agent” under common law. 349  It 
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means that the civil law notion of “agency” is broader than in common law, encompassing 
both direct and indirect representation.350 
Independent. Generally, an agent is dependent, if the business interests of the principal 
and the agent have merged. 351  Independent agent is independent both legally and 
economically. From legal perspective, important criteria are “detailed instructions” and 
“comprehensive control”.352 Economic independence may be defined by the number of 
principals for which an agent acts and the level of entrepreneurial risk. 353  The more 
principals an agent engages with, the more likely it is that we deal with independent 
agent.354 An independent agent also typically bears the risk of losses for his activities.355 
Commentary to OECD Model lists a number of criterion that may (“relevant criteria”) or 
may not (“insufficient criteria”) trigger PE status: 
Table 6. Dependence test criteria under OECD Model Tax Convention 
Relevant criteria Insufficient criteria (if applied 
independently) 
• “obligations vis-à-vis enterprise” 
(OECD, Commentary to Article 5, 
Para 103) 
• “detailed instructions” (OECD, 
Commentary to Article 5, Para 103) 
• “comprehensive controls” (OECD, 
Commentary to Article 5, Para 103) 
• Burden of “entrepreneurial risk” 
• “Comprehensive control” 
• “Number of principals represented 
by the agent” (OECD, Commentary 
• “Limitations on scope of business” 
(OECD, Commentary to Article 5, 
Para 107) 
• “substantial information … in 
connection with the  business” 
(OECD, Commentary to Article 5, 
Para 108) 
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to Article 5, Para 109-111) 
Extent of the obligations regarding the enterprise and distribution of entrepreneurial risk 
between the enterprise and the agent are key determinants of whether agent is 
dependent. 356  If an agent represents an independent enterprise, activities of this agent 
should not result in rendering it a PE.357 If commercial activities of the agent are regulated 
by detailed instructions or fall under comprehensive control of the enterprise, we deal with 
dependent agent.358 Independent agent, in contrast, is responsible for the agency results, 
but is not bound by strict regulations from the side of enterprise.359 Limitations of scale of 
business normally would not fall under the concept of enterprise control and thus will not 
affect the dependency test.360 It is also important to remember that dependent agency risk 
overlaps significantly with increasing employee mobility risks. Namely, an employee 
acting on behalf of the employer entity in role of the employee, or a partner representing 
partnership are not independent.361 
Ordinary course of business. OECD Commentaries historically have not provide any 
detailed clues to what term “ordinary course of business” means.362 While Article 5(5) is 
fairly useless in common law system, and Article 5(6) is fairly useless in civil law system, 
together they give a coherent view on dependent agent PE concept, at least as long as “one 
reads only the version in one’s own language and system of law without asking what it 
means in another language and system of law”.363 This concept is based on the assumption 
that an agent is considered dependent if his activity exactly answers the core of the 
principal's business.364 Thus the business of the principal might be the standard to which 
actual activity is compared.365 Intermediation activities indistinguishable from each other 
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amount to the ordinary course of business.366 Performing activities unrelated to the agency 
business mean that agent is not acting in the ordinary course of business.367 
However, certain questions are left open when it comes to defining impact on dependent 
agent test for determining PE as shown in matrix below.  
Table 7. Dependent agent test uncertainties under revised OECD Model Tax 
Convention 2017368 
  Acting in the ordinary course of business: 
  YES NO 
Legal and economic 
independence: 
YES NO PE PE if Article 5(5)? 
NO PE if Article 5(5)? PE if Article 5(5)? 
 
Namely, we are facing following questions: “ 
1. When does an associated enterprise constitute an agency PE? 
2. Can an associated enterprise be an independent agent 
3. If an associated enterprise constitutes an agency PE; how are profits on an 
independent enterprise basis to be taxed when two similar rules seem to be 
applicable, Article 7(2) and Article9(1)?  
4. (Is the result different when an associated enterprise does or does not constitute an 
agency PE?”369 
4.4.7 Special provisions 
Finding a PE is impacted by two additional circumstances: whether agent is closely related 
to the enterprise it represents and whether agent activities can be considered 
preparatory/auxiliary. 
Representation of closely related enterprise. Under updated Article 5(6) of OECD 
Model Tax Convention an agent should not be rendered independent if it “acts exclusively 
or almost exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is closely related”.370 
This amendment was brought by Action 7 of the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative proposes 
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stricter independence rules. Under Article 15(1) of the MLI, a person is closely related to 
an enterprise if in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the 
other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises (50% test). These 
provisions make it much easier for tax authorities to claim the existence of a PE through 
dependent agent PE concept.371 This will especially affect digital economy activities that 
do not have physical presence in the source state, for example in case of servers hosting the 
software.372 
Preparatory/auxiliary activities. From the OECD Model (1977) onward the entire 
exception clause of article 5(4) of the OECD Model is applicable under article 5(5) of the 
OECD Model. 373  There is ongoing debate on the need for strict interpretation of the 
wording of article 5(4) of the OECD Model (1963) or the aim and purpose of the 
regulation. 374  Terms “auxiliary” and “preparatory” constitute the qualitative criterion 
which determination always depends on the main activities in the enterprise. 375  The 
cumulation of excepted activities does not guarantee the non-PE status if the cumulation of 
such activities amounts to an essential or significant business activity.376 
This analysis shows the general trends to lower PE threshold by narrowing scope where 
general agency PE rule can apply.  MNEs should be prepared for scrutiny of status of 
closely related enterprise and rigorous assessment of a real economic nature of 
“preparatory” activities. On a more general level, tax authorities will explore the agency 
relationship criteria of nature of activity, identity of counterparty and temporal 
characteristics.377 
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4.5. Dependent agent PE risk ranking, prioritisation and assessment  
Amendments to dependent agent PE concept has caused numerous concerns in business 
environment. For example, European Banking Federation, the united voice of banks 
established in Europe,378 that the proposals brought by BEPS project show a lack of clear 
principles or consensus on the interpretation of standards, include vague terms, 
substantially lower the threshold for what constitutes a PE and can result in increasing 
amount of tax disputes.379 
Also, many large exporting countries are concerned that the expansion of dependent agent 
PE concept will result in a significant burden for multinationals. 380 Due to this, they do not 
plan to amend their treaties via the Multilateral Convention. 381  By June 2017, of 68 
countries which had signed the MLI, 39 had opted out of the changes to Article 5(5) and 26 
had opted out of the Article 5(4) changes altogether.382 However, as the concept of value 
creation as an allocation principle is present not only in the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative, 
but also at an EU level,55 it is unlikely that it will be withdrawn from international 
agenda.383 
Stakeholders can only hope that countries will consistently follow the new guidelines for 
the application of the revised Article 5(4) of OECD Model, otherwise, there is a hope for 
Action 14, which goal is to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.384 
However, despite backlash to recent changes both from business community and state 
representatives, there are certain factors that urge MNEs to prioritise the dependent agent 
risk in planning their distribution activities. Namely, MNEs can withess evident 
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determination of OECD and national/supra-national thresholds to lower PE threshold to 
increase tax revenue especially from well-profitable industries (such as consumer 
electronics). This research has explored the ongoing work at the level of OECD and the EU 
to update taxation regime for digital economy.  
4.6. Risk analysis 
As I explained in chapter 2 on general approach to PE risk management, at risk analysis 
stage it is important to systematically weigh and group risks arising from PE provisions 
based on frequency, gravity and consequences of risks. 385  Changes enabled by BEPS 
Action 7 created more ground for subjectivity and uncertainty, thus increasing the risk of 
disputes between taxpayers and tax administrations.386  Analysis of dependent agent PE 
concept has helped to identify high-risk situations. Namely, dependent agent PE is likely to 
be triggered in case of an agent with a low level of entrepreneurial risk, who plays a 
leading role in concluding agreement in a source state, even if the agreement was formally 
signed in another state. The primary target will be commissionaire agreements. Low-risk 
distribution agreements where persons act on their own behalf are on the opposite side of 
the risk scale as activities unlikely to fall under PE scope. In practice, substance-over-the-
form approach may put even limited risk distributors under the scrutiny. Tax authorities are 
most likely to strictly assess criterion of “habitual conclusion”/”principal role leading to 
the conclusions of contracts” and explore whether the taxpayers abuse the exceptions to 
general agency PE rule. 
4.7. Risk treatment 
Risk analysis has shown that it is becoming more challenging for MNEs to find the right 
balance between risk management and control in a goal to design a viable operating 
model. 387  From practical perspective, risks treatment stage should empower the 
stakeholders to identify the different types of dependent agent (PEs) in the post-OECD 
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BEPS environment; compare the pre-BEPS and post-BEPS PE provisions  recognise what 
business activities and structures are affected by new rules.388 
Based on tax risk management stages described in chapter 2, tax control framework should 
aim at: 
1. Enhancing communications on provisions regulating dependent agent PE in post-
BEPS environment. 
2. Enhancing dependent agent PE risk assessment of existing and planned business 
arrangement. 
3. Enhancing tax function role in actual document management. 
Next stage will be to identify what key characteristics are necessary for a tax control 
framework to address PE risk effectively. 
4.7.1. PE risk communications across stakeholders 
Communications will cover multiple stakeholders, from board of the company, to the agent, 
himself, to ensure that both parties to the agency relationship have the same understanding 
of their rights and obligations, and of PE concept. Stakeholder scope in managing PE risk 
concept includes not only predictably tax function, board, legal and HR departments, but 
also sales and customer service functions of the enterprise. It means, that communications 
should be clear, simple and visual enough to fit with competence, schedule and goals of 
diverse groups. For example, Electrolux Tax Policy clearly states that employees should be 
guided by the company Code of Conduct and corporate citizenship values also in tax-
related questions.389 
The starting point of communication is to ensure that dependent agent PE risk is managed 
in the light of general tax strategy framework aiming at ensuring compliance with 
corporate social responsibility principles. Communication is especially important because 
risk management is a team planning in condition of high uncertainty about future markets 
and regulatory changes.390 This will ensure that stakeholders have the same understanding 
of what constitutes dependent agent PE risk.  Complexity of dependent agent PE concept 
shows the need to address it through “tone from the top”. This means essentially the board 
involvement. Namely, we can observe a strong correlation between success and reputation 
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of the company which is based on general perception of it.391 Making any mistake in 
ensuring tax compliance will have an adverse impact on the brand, reputation of the board, 
and, more generally, “social licence to operate” (especially, operate profitably) locally and 
globally.392 Senior management are striving towards better tax transparency because of 
potential material impact on financial statements and raise more complex questions on 
managing tax exposure.393 Thus, it is important to ensure early and direct communication 
with CEOs, boards and senior managers about concerns the tax administration may have in 
relation to how business manages its tax compliance and pays taxes from PE.394 
 
4.7.2. Document management 
Results of PwC survey on managing PE risk (2012) have shown that a large majority of 
respondents had difficulty to monitor how other departments, such as HR and Sales, 
implement guidance of tax function correctly.395This shows the need to develop policies 
and guidelines that are easy to implement and monitor. This brings us to the last aspect of 
treating dependent agent PE risk – document management.  
Aim of the efficient document management is to help the tax function to connect with 
essential people through drafting and managing clear procedures, ensure understanding of 
processes and tax data, and equip stakeholders with tools to evaluate present and planned 
operation models through the tax framework. 396 It enables retention, centralisation, 
management, security and easy access to documents, both in paper and electronic forms.397 
Improving oversight, data collection and documentation of where people are, what they are 
doing and for whom is the key in assessing whether existing operating model is robust 
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enough to face PE risk challenges.398  Proper documentation equips the enterprise with the 
means to demonstrate that activities are based on sound business rationale rather than mere 
realisation of tax savings or even tax avoidance. 399 For this reason, contracts should clearly 
define the core activities of each party to the contract and the contractual rationale should 
be consistent with business model and other activities or practices of the enterprise. 400  
In assessment of business arrangements on distribution, we can identify following 
challenges: 
• Drafting and reviewing numerous contracts in case of global sales presence 
• Management, storage and archiving of contracts 
• Review of matching between actual conduct and contractual agreement 
• Adjustments of contracts to legal changes.401 
 
The key tool to address it would be implementation of checklists. Checklists in a form of 
series of questions or a list of topics (individual or standard checklists) provide a 
convenient way for management to rapidly identify possible risks.402 
4.7.3. Assessment of business arrangements  
Efficient document management allows to conduct accurate assessment of business models 
in light of tax legislation changes. Dependent agent PE risk may arise when the enterprise 
enters the new market, restructures existing business arrangements, review substantial 
provisions of contracts or recruit new agents to represent their interests abroad. Mainly, 
analysis of OECD approach to tax management helps to identify several blocks of 
questions to assess business arrangements. 
Table 8. Distribution model assessment for dependent agent PE risk management 
purposes.403 
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Group 1. Rationale and essence of business arrangements 
1. What commercial objectives your enterprise is seeking under proposed 
structure of agency agreements? 
2. What is expected financial benefit? 
3. Are the actual/forecasted tax result at odds with expected commercial 
results? 
4. Is proposed/existing agency structure more complex than needed to achieve 
set commercial objectives? 
5. Are there any steps or arrangements in the distribution model designed with 
a primary goal to avoid taxes? 
6. Is the strategy or the details of transactions consistence with the substance 
of distribution business model? 
Group 2. Knowledge management in transaction assessment 
1. Is the factual basis of provided analysis fully accurate and correspond with 
perceptions of all stakeholders? 
2. How confident are the key stakeholders about the advice received on 
managing PE risk (e.g. advice from external sources, such as consultancy)? 
3. Is advice based on the actual transaction/business model or expectation how 
it will be implemented? 
4. If the advice is based on assumptions, are these assumptions reasonable and 
realistic? If these assumptions do not stay true in the eyes of tax authorities, 
how would this impact the applicability of analysis? 
5. Were potential changes taken into account when performing analysis of the 
transaction?  
Group 3. Cooperation with tax authorities 
1. How likely is it that tax authority will have different understanding how law 
should be applied to the business model in question? 
2. How material this understanding might be? How can it impact the deemed 
tax risk profile of the enterprise? 
3. How high is the risk of litigation in case if tax authority is not prepared to 
settle the dispute? 
4. If the tax authorities take a different approach, and this disagreement results 
in litigation, how likely is it that the court decision will favour approach of 
the tax authority? 
5. What will be the downside if the company loses the litigation? 
This questionnaire can be used in implementing interviewing technique that provides a 
means of soliciting information e.g. from project personnel.404 It should be used in close 
connection with strengthening communications across stakeholders. 
4.8. Conclusions 
Managing PE risk in case of dependent agents has several specifics. First, it depends 
substantially on understanding nuances of how legal concepts of agency, contracts and 
obligations are interpreted under domestic law. Second, it requires a deep-dive into 
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economic, not only legal substance of business arrangements due to BEPS Action 7 
approach and general trend to lower dependent agent PE threshold. 
Testing tax risk management stages on the example of dependent agent PE risk has helped 
to reach important findings. First, analysis of dependent agent PE risk has shown the 
increasing tendency of the tax authorities to expore factual and economic nature of 
arrangements, rather than formal features such as signing the agreement. Moreover, tax 
planning patterns enabled by digital economy make the legislators to rethink the concept of 
agent role to lower PE threshold. 
In light of this, addressing dependent agent PE risk requires a structured multi-stage 
approach to ensure engagement all stakeholders and to guarantee the alignment of PE risk 
management with the general tax governance framework and values of the enterprise. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The research objective of the thesis was to identify main PE risks faced by multinational 
enterprises at different stages of value chain, with focus on distribution, and explore ways 
how enterprises can manage these risks through analysing, prioritising and treating the 
risks. 
First, research has uncovered the challenges in balancing roles of PE concept in ensuring 
both sufficient tax revenue and flexibility for taxpayers. Complexity of PE concept stems 
from multiple roles it has played historically in ensuring stable source of tax revenue and at 
the same time, development of cross-border trade. Moreover, the PE definition emerged at 
the time when business could be carried only through physical place of business, and 
nowadays digital economy reality that distorts the traditional concept of PE as physical 
place of presence. Complexity of theoretic approach to PE concept in OECD Model is 
multiplied by diverse sources of law that may define presence of PE on case-by-case basis 
– supranational regulations (e.g., the EU law), bilateral and multilateral tax treaties, 
domestic laws and often unpredictable case law. 
Second, research has shown that addressing PE risk requires a deep understanding of tax 
compliance principles, tax strategy of the enterprise, as well as of key principles and 
rationale of tax risk management through tax controls framework. Tax risk management is 
necessary to identify root causes of failing to meet expectations of tax authorities. Namely, 
tax management allows to identify tax risks at the early stage and analyse them, prioritise 
what risks to address first and how to treat them. In case of PE risk management, efficient 
system of monitoring is a necessary stage, as it allows to keep up with changing regulatory 
environment, especially in light of measures states take after BEPS Action 7. 
Comprehensive tax risk management framework will ensure that MNE will not overlook 
risks that are likely to happen due to communication failures, agency problems or 
misunderstanding of applicable regulations. 
Third, looking into dependent agent PE risk as one of the most probable risks in the value 
chain of enterprise has revealed important aspects that the enterprises should take into 
account when planning their tax controls. Namely, MNEs should be ready to scrutinize 
their arrangements with third parties under criteria stated by Article 5(5) of OECD Model 
Tax Convention and define what criteria are most applicable and pose the greatest risk 
 77 
 
exactly for their arrangements. MNEs should pay a special attention to the criterion of 
habitual conclusion or “principal role leading to conclusion of the contracts” due to 
determination of tax authorities to explore the real economic substance of transaction 
model, not just legal formalities. In addition to that, concepts of “agency” and “contracts” 
itself may receive dubious interpretation under applicable national laws, especially due to 
differences between civil and common law systems. Risk management framework allows 
to identify unobvious cases when PE status may be triggered, prioritise risks arising from 
global employee mobility, storage and distribution arrangements, and address these risks 
through improving communications with key stakeholders and enhancing document 
management framework.   
Analysis shows three prerequisites of efficient PE risk management for MNEs. First comes 
the ability to grasp the role, background and upcoming changes in PE concept, and thus, 
identify expectations of tax authorities in different legal systems. Second is the ability to 
ensure sufficient document management system that would allow all stakeholders to have 
accurate understanding of business models that are impacted by legislation changes. Third 
is the ability to efficiently assess risks arising from concrete business arrangements based 
on solid understanding of PE concept and effective management of tax-related 
documentation. 
This research did not address such aspects of PE risk analysis as profit distribution of PE, 
including interpretation of arm's length principle, and dispute resolution mechanism that 
businesses can revert to. These topics would make the subject of the separate research. 
However, the tax controls framework helps to have a systematised approach to risk 
mapping and, therefore, to comprehend the scope of risks even before starting a deeper 
analysis.
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<http://www.roedl.net/pl/en/hot_news/appointment_of_a_sales_representative_vs_ri
sk_of_permanent_establishment.html> accessed 21 October 2018  
18. Managing global tax risks (Ernst & Young LLP, 2003) 2 
<https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-
_Managing_global_tax_risks/$FILE/EY-global-tax-risk-tool.pdf> accessed 21 
October 2018 
19. Managing operational risk, 2014 Tax Risk and Controversy Survey Series (EYGM 
Limited, 2014) 7<https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Managing-
operational-tax-risk/$FILE/EY-managing-operational-tax-risk.pdf>  accessed 21 
October 2018 
20. Managing operational risk, 2014 Tax Risk and Controversy Survey Series (EYGM 
Limited, 2014) 1 <https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Managing-
operational-tax-risk/$FILE/EY-managing-operational-tax-risk.pdf> accessed 21 
October 2018 
21. Nason, Jim, “Tax Offerings for the Telecommunications Industry” (Deloitte, 2018) 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/tax/solutions/tax-services-
telecommunications-industry.html> accessed 21 October 2018  
22. Paice, Gary et al, “Managing operational risk” (EY) 
<https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/tax-policy-and-controversy/ey-2014-
managing-operational-tax-risk-policies-processes-and-controls> accessed 21 
October 2018  
23. Permanent establishment risk checklist (Velocity, 26 February 2018) 
<https://velocityglobal.com/blog/permanent-establishment-risk-checklist/> accessed 
21 October 2018  
24. Permanent establishments: Recent trends and developments (EY, 2015) 10 
<https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-permanent-
establishments/$FILE/ey-permanent-establishments.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018 
25. Pinto, Ariel and Luna Magpili, Operational Risk Management (Momentum Press, 
2015) 16  
26. PwC, The Past, Present and Future of Permanent Establishment (September 2017) 9 
<https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2017/the-past-present-and-future-of-
permanent-establishment.pdf> accessed 20 October 2018 
27. Ridder de, Marvin, Managing tax: Balancing current challenge with future promise 
(Deloitte, 30 November – 1 December 2016) 4 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-
tmc-emea-conference-2016-tax-risk-management-and-control.pdf> accessed 21 
October 2018 
28. Ruggiero, Paolo, “New guidance on permanent establishments – practical 
considerations & recent tax disputes” (Taxand, 16 November 2017) 
<https://www.taxand.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/New-OECD-guidance-on-
 XII 
 
Permanent-Establishments-2017-Taxand-TP-Conference.pdf> accessed 23 October 
2018 
29. Ruiter de, Marlies, “Comments on the OECD Revised Discussion Draft on BEPS 
Action 7 
30. Smits, Axel and Isabel Verlinden, “Permanent Establishments 2.0: At the heart of 
the matter” (PwC, 2013) 15 
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/assets/pwc-permanent-
establishments-at-the-heart-of-the-matter-final.pdf> accessed 21 October 2018  
31. Sonia Watson, Permanent Establishment risk – a new approach (PwC, 11 September 
2014) <http://pwc.blogs.com/tax/2014/09/permanent-establishment-risk-a-new-
approach.html> accessed 21 October 2018  
32. Tax in the boardroom (KPMG, November 2016) 3 
<https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/nz/pdf/November/tax-in-the-
boardroom-kpmg-nz.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018 
33. Tax Risk Management (KPMG) 
<https://home.kpmg.com/ie/en/home/services/tax/corporate-tax/tax-risk-
management.html> accessed 21 October 2018  
34. The Tax Function of the Future Enhancing Tax Process Management and Controls – 
Workflow, Document Management and Collaboration (PwC, 2016) 11 
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/assets/enhancing-tax-process-
managemnt-and-controls.pdf> accessed 22 October 2018  
35. Verstappen, Rudy, Tjeerd van den Berg and Hifsa Younus, “Tax Transparency 
Benchmark 2017” (PwC, November 2017) 13 
<https://www.pwc.nl/nl/assets/documents/pwc-tax-transparency-benchmark-
2017.pdf> accessed 21 October 2018  
36. Webinar: Permanent Establishment Risks in International Tax Planning and 
Structuring in the Post-BEPS Era (IFBD, 2017) 
<https://www.ibfd.org/Training/Webinar-Permanent-Establishment-Risks-
International-Tax-Planning-and-Structuring-Post-BEPS> accessed 22 October 2018  
 
Source of law and government information 
1. General Guidelines for the Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishment 
(VERO, 30 April 2018) <https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-
guidance/guidance/59583/general-guidelines-for-the-attribution-of-income-to-
permanent-establishment2/> accessed 10 October 2018 
2. Income taxation of foreign corporate entities (VERO, 30 April 2018) 
<https://www.vero.fi/en/detailed-guidance/guidance/47806/income-taxation-of-
foreign-corporate-entities/> accessed 20 October 2018  
3. Laki verotusmenettelystä 18.12.1995/1558 (Finnish Act on Assessment Procedure) 
4. Nordic Tax Treaty (Nordisk eTax) 
<https://www.nordisketax.net/main.asp?url=/ntt.asp&c=sve&l=eng> accessed 20 
October 2018  
5. Tuloverolaki  30.12.1992/1535 (Finnish Income Tax Act) 
6. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969 
 
Other 
1. Electrolux Group, “Electrolux retains position as industry leader in Dow Jones 
Sustainability Indices” (13 September 2018) 
<https://www.electroluxgroup.com/en/electrolux-retains-position-as-industry-
leader-in-dow-jones-sustainability-indices-26095/> accessed 20 October 2018 
 XIII 
 
2. European Commission Fiscalis Risk Analysis Project Group, Risk Management 
Guide for Tax Administrations (2006)  
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/resources/documents/taxa
tion/tax_cooperation/gen_overview/risk_management_guide_for_tax_administratio
ns_en.pdf > accessed 20 October 2018 
3. HM Revenue & Customers, Tax Compliance Risk Management (12 April 2016, 
updated 13 March 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/tax-
compliance-risk-management> accessed 20 October 2018 
4. HMRC internal manual, Import and National Clearance Hub Procedures (HM 
Revenue & Customs, 30 June 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-
manuals/import-and-national-clearance-hub-procedures/inchp02060> accessed 23 
October 2018  
5. ICC comments on “Revised proposals concerning the interpretation and application 
of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment)” (ICC, 2013) 4 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/PERMESTICC.pdf> accessed 9 November 2018 
6. Interpretation and Application of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention (IFBD, 2012) 4 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/49782184.pdf> accessed 9 November 2018 
7. Tax Control Framework. From a focus on risks to being in control: a different 
approach 
(Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration, March 2008) 19 
<https://download.belastingdienst.nl/itd/beleid/overige/tax_control_framework.pdf> 
accessed 21 October 2018  
8. Tax policy (Electrolux, 10 July 2018) 4 <https://www.electroluxgroup.com/en/tax-
policy-22164/> accessed 22 October 2018 
 
  
 XIV 
 
ANNEX 1. Structure of Article 5 “Permanent Establishment” of OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital 
Note: Highlighting and other formatting added by author. Rows highlighted in blue show 
changes brought to 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention. 
Text Content and 
references to research 
Changes in comparison with OECD 
Model Tax Convention 2014 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, 
the term “permanent establishment” 
means a fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is 
wholly or partly carried on. 
PE definition (2.2, 
2.5) 
No 
2. The term “permanent establishment” 
includes especially: 
a) a place of management; 
b) a branch; 
c) an office; 
d) a factory; 
e) a workshop, and 
f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or 
any other place of extraction of natural 
resources. 
Open-ended list of PE 
examples (2.5) 
No 
3.  A building site or construction or 
installation project constitutes a 
permanent establishment only if it lasts 
more than twelve months. 
Construction/Installati
on PE with duration 
criterion (2.5) 
No 
4. Notwithstanding the preceding 
provisions of this Article, the term 
“permanent establishment” shall be 
deemed not to include: 
a)  the use of facilities solely for the 
purpose of storage, display or delivery 
of goods or merchandise belonging to 
the enterprise; 
b) the maintenance of a stock of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise solely for the purpose of 
storage, display or delivery; 
c) the maintenance of a stock of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the 
enterprise solely for the purpose of 
processing by another enterprise; 
d) the maintenance of a fixed place of 
business solely for the purpose of 
purchasing goods or merchandise or 
of collecting information, for the 
enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of 
business solely for the purpose of 
carrying on, for the enterprise, any 
other activity of a preparatory or 
auxiliary character;  
f) the maintenance of a fixed place of 
Exceptions to general 
PE rule  
(activities of 
“preparatory or 
auxiliary character” 
mainly connected 
with purposes of: 
• “storage, 
display, or 
delivery”, 
• “processing 
by another 
enterprise”, 
• “collecting 
information”) 
 (2.5, 4.4.7) 
No 
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business solely for any combination of 
activities mentioned in subparagraphs a) 
to e), provided that the overall activity 
of the fixed place of business resulting 
from this combination is of a 
preparatory or auxiliary character, 
provided that such activity or, in the 
case of subparagraph f), the overall 
activity of the fixed  place of business, is 
of a preparatory or auxiliary character. 
 
4.1  Paragraph 4 shall not apply to a 
fixed place of business that is used or 
maintained by an enterprise if the same 
enterprise or a closely related 
enterprise carries on business activities 
at  the same place or at another place 
in the same Contracting State and a) 
that place or other place constitutes a 
permanent establishment for the 
enterprise or the closely related 
enterprise under the provisions of this 
Article, or b)  the overall activity 
resulting from the combination of the 
activities carried on by the two 
enterprises at the same place, or by the 
same enterprise or closely related 
enterprises at the two places, is not of a 
preparatory or auxiliary character, 
provided that the business activities 
carried on by the two enterprises at the 
same place, or by the  same enterprise 
or closely related enterprises at the two 
places, constitute complementary  
functions that are part of a cohesive 
business operation.  
Provision on closely 
related enterprises 
under which 
exceptions to general 
PE rule do not apply 
(4.2, 4.4.7) 
Paragraph 4.1 added in OECD 
Model Tax Convention 2017 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraphs 1 and 2  but subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 6, where a 
person − other than an agent of an 
independent status to whom paragraph 
6  applies  − is acting in a Contracting 
State on behalf of an enterprise and has, 
and habitually  exercises, in a 
Contracting State, an authority to 
conclude contracts, in doing so, 
habitually concludes contracts, or 
habitually plays the principal role 
leading to the conclusion of contracts 
that are  routinely concluded without 
material modification by the 
enterprise, and these contracts  are a) 
in the name of the enterprise, or b) for 
the transfer of the ownership of, or 
for the granting of the right to use, 
Dependent agent PE: 
scope and exceptions 
under Article 5(4) 
(4.2, 4.3) 
(OECD Model Tax Convention 
2014) 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraphs 1 and 2, where a 
person - other than an agent of an 
independent status to whom 
paragraph 6 applies - is acting on 
behalf of an enterprise and has, and 
habitually exercises, in a 
Contracting State an authority to 
conclude contracts in the name of 
the enterprise, than enterprise shall 
be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in that State in respect 
of any activities which that person 
undertakes for the enterprise, unless 
the activities of such person are 
limited to those mentioned in 
paragraph 4 which, if exercised 
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property owned  by that enterprise or 
that the enterprise has the right to 
use, or c) for the provision of services 
by that enterprise, that enterprise shall 
be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in that State in respect of 
any activities which that person 
undertakes for the enterprise, unless the 
activities of such person are limited to 
those mentioned in paragraph 4 
which, if exercised through a fixed place 
of business (other than a fixed place of 
business to which paragraph 4.1 would 
apply), would not make this fixed place 
of business a permanent establishment 
under the provisions of that paragraph. 
through a fixed place of business, 
would not make this fixed place of 
business a permanent establishment 
under provisions of that paragraph. 
6.  Paragraph 5 shall not apply where the 
person acting in a Contracting State on 
behalf of an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State carries on business in 
the first-mentioned State as an 
independent agent and acts for the 
enterprise in the ordinary course of 
business.  
Dependent agent PE 
rule scope: 
inapplicability to 
independent agents 
(4.4.6) 
6. An enterprise shall not be deemed 
to have a permanent establishment 
in a Contracting State merely 
because it carries on business in that 
State through a broker, general 
commission agent or any other 
agent of an independent status, 
provided that such persons are 
acting in the ordinary course of 
their business.   
Where, however, a person acts 
exclusively or almost exclusively on 
behalf of one or more enterprises to 
which it is closely related, that person 
shall not be considered to be an 
independent agent within the meaning of 
this paragraph with respect of any such 
enterprise. 
 
Provision on closely 
related enterprises 
(4.4.7) 
Second subparagraph of paragraph 
6 added in OECD Model Tax 
Convention 2017 
7. The fact that a company which is a 
resident of a Contracting State controls 
or is controlled by a company which is 
a resident of the other Contracting 
State, or which carries on business in 
that other State (whether through a 
permanent establishment or otherwise), 
shall not of itself constitute either 
company a permanent establishment of 
the other. 
 No changes 
8. For the purposes of this Article, a 
person or enterprise is closely related to 
an enterprise if, based on all the relevant 
facts and circumstances, one has 
control of the other or both are under 
the control of the same persons or 
enterprises. In any case, a person or 
enterprise  shall be  considered to be 
closely related to an enterprise if one 
possesses directly or indirectly more 
Definition and criteria 
of closely related 
enterprises (4.4.7) 
Paragraph 8 added in OECD Model 
Tax Convention 2017 
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than  50 per cent of the beneficial 
interest in the other (or, in the case of a 
company, more than 50 per cent of the 
aggregate vote and value of the 
company’s shares or of the beneficial 
equity interest  in the company) or if 
another person or enterprise  
possesses directly or in directly more 
than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest 
(or, in the case of a company, more than 
50 per cent of the aggregate vote and 
value of the company’s shares or of the 
beneficial equity interest in the 
company) in the person and the 
enterprise or in the two enterprises. 
 
